When Killers Become Victims: Diversionary War,Human Rights,and Strategic Target Selection

The diversionary theory largely focuses on the incentives leaders have to use force. However, little attention has been given to the characteristics that make for a good target. We argue that US presidents choose targets that repress human rights since they are the easiest to sell to international and domestic audiences. By targeting repressive states US presidents can justify their use of force by cloaking their motivation in the language of human rights, responding to calls for intervention, pointing to the failure of international actors and institutions to resolve these problems, and building upon emerging norms that allow for intervention in repressive states. Updating US Use of Force data, we empirically test and find support for our hypothesis that presidents target human rights abusers when they face trouble at home. This paper contributes to target selection process by offering a complete theory of diversionary conflict accounting for cost/benefit calculation of presidents. Moreover, we believe that our findings reveal human rights practices’ role in international conflict, as well.     

How Conditioning on Posttreatment Variables Can Ruin Your Experiment and What to Do about It

In principle, experiments offer a straightforward method for social scientists to accurately estimate causal effects. However, scholars often unwittingly distort treatment effect estimates by conditioning on variables that could be affected by their experimental manipulation. Typical examples include controlling for posttreatment variables in statistical models, eliminating observations based on posttreatment criteria, or subsetting the data based on posttreatment variables. Though these modeling choices are intended to address common problems encountered when conducting experiments, they can bias estimates of causal effects. Moreover, problems associated with conditioning on posttreatment variables remain largely unrecognized in the field, which we show frequently publishes experimental studies using these practices in our discipline's most prestigious journals. We demonstrate the severity of experimental posttreatment bias analytically and document the magnitude of the potential distortions it induces using visualizations and reanalyses of real‐world data. We conclude by providing applied researchers with recommendations for best practice.     

The MAD Who Wasn't There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear Balance

What do nuclear weapons mean for the stability of the military balance? Mutually assured destruction (MAD) describes a stalemated balance of power where nuclear adversaries possess survivable retaliatory capabilities that ensure neither side can escape devastation in an all-out nuclear war. Moreover, the strong form of this empirical claim, which one might term “deep MAD,” is that mutual vulnerability is an inalterable and unchangeable condition. Drawing from recently declassified primary sources, we test several of deep MAD's premises and predictions on one of its foundational cases: Soviet nuclear policy during the second half of the Cold War. We find that Soviet leaders remained seriously concerned about the nuclear balance even in an allegedly deep-MAD environment where warheads numbered in the tens of thousands. Indeed, Soviet leaders were uncertain that they could indefinitely maintain a secure second strike despite strenuous efforts. The reason for these discrepancies, we argue, is that the nuclear balance is actually more malleable than commonly admitted. The possibility that MAD might one day be escaped meant that US attempts to manipulate the nuclear balance during the latter part of the Cold War could carry political weight, even while MAD was still possible.     

Labour and Antisemitism: a Crisis Misunderstood

In this article, we argue that Labour’s antisemitism crisis has been misunderstood. We suggest that a more accurate and sophisticated understanding of antisemitism offers a way forward. There are three elements to this claim. First, by drawing on existing data on attitudes towards Jews, we criticise the widespread focus on individual ‘antisemites’, rather than on the broader problem of antisemitism. In turn, we conceive of antisemitism not as a virus or poison, as in so many formulations, but rather, as a reservoir of readily available images and ideas that subsist in our political culture. Second, following on from this understanding, we offer five ways forward. Finally, we set this analysis in the context of a historical parting of the ways between anti-racism and opposition to antisemitism. An anti-racism defined solely by conceptions of whiteness and power, we argue, has proven unable to fully acknowledge and account for anti-Jewish racism.     

OLAF’s role in the fight against fraud in the European Union: do too many cooks spoil the broth?

This article discusses the role of OLAF in the fight against fraud in the European Union (EU) by examining (1) its powers and capacity to coordinate the activities of anti-fraud agencies in the twenty seven member states and (2) the constraints which prevent OLAF from operating in a more effective manner. It also analyses OLAF’s relationship with other transnational agencies such as Eurojust and Europol and highlights the degree of fragmentation which exists among the many actors involved in the fight against fraud, a fragmented legal approach and the difficulties this presents in attempting to police sophisticated transnational frauds. The effect of EU expansion on this situation is considered and the support offered to new member states who have been asked to bring their anti-fraud structures up to the standards of existing members within a very short period of time is also examined. The efforts of Romania in seeking to build up anti-fraud structures and systems are discussed in some detail. This article concludes that despite the best efforts of the actors involved, a fragmented legal system and institutions have hampered the fight against fraud in the EU.