Power, sovereignty, and the great republic: Anglo-American diplomatic relations in the era of the Civil War

Historians have tended to view the American Civil War (1861-65) as a milestone in Anglo-American relations. It marked the transfer of dominance from Great Britain to the United States in the Western Hemisphere. As Great Britain backed the losing side overwhelming American power brought about a British withdrawal. This article argues that this is a very oversimplified interpretation of their relations in this period. Britain did not intervene in the Civil War because it was not good policy; throughout the British relied on deterrence because, save for the war years, American power could not be translated into military power. The British secured most of their policy objectives thanks to a combination of prudent and conciliatory conduct, and a desire to avoid war, but also due to calm resolution that belied belligerent and sometimes outlandish public statements. British leaders have often been criticized for hypocrisy and double standards, but such criticisms seem unfair. Their belief that the Civil War was futile resulted from a humanitarian desire to halt the killing. It should be remembered that although the nineteenth century witnessed many local conflicts, great wars seem to have disappeared. It therefore appeared to be a laudable objective to attempt to arbitrate in what turned out to be the greatest war after 1815. It is also important to recall that Europeans were less interested in this conflict than the Americans themselves, and that preoccupation with affairs closer to home led to hasty and erroneous judgements.     

Legal Issues and Human Rights Dimensions of the Israeli Settlements Issue: Victims and Spoilers

The presenters on this panel discussed several important additional requirements for the successful implementation of a two-state solution that involves significant relocation of settlers. These requirements include balancing rights among different groups, minimizing the impact of "spoilers," and providing political compensation to settlers. Presenters also highlighted the relevance of elements of classic negotiation theory to this issue, including thinking creatively about substance and paying appropriate attention to process.     

Red or Expert? The Anglo–Soviet Exchange of Ambassadors in 1929

Throughout the 1920s, distrust and contention marked Anglo–Soviet relations, culminating in the diplomatic break in 1927. In 1929, the incoming Labour government successfully pursued its objective of re-establishing diplomatic relations with Moscow, but the follow-up in terms of ambassadorial appointments was far from routine for either side. This analysis shows that internal pressures complicated decisions about whether to appoint career diplomats or choose political figures. Resisting both claims from enthusiastically hopeful Labour backbenchers and criticisms from the left wing media, the British foreign secretary, Arthur Henderson, chose a Russian-speaking career diplomat. On the Soviet side, the first choice was a controversial politician, but then replaced by a financial expert, albeit one tainted as a defeated political opponent of Josef Stalin. Whilst both ambassadors could be considered “professionals,” neither was able to have a deep impact on the relationship, which remained troubled.     

Fatal Case of Hydrophilic Polymer Emboli

Hydrophilic polymers are used to coat catheters and other intravascular devices. In general, these polymers have many salutary properties; however, in some instances, fragmentation of hydrophilic polymers coating intravascular devices can occur with fatal consequences. This report details the histopathologic changes in the lung seen following polymer fragmentation and embolization from a central venous catheter. Polymer emboli detected microscopically are intravascular and consist of basophilic, lamellated, and nonrefractile elements. Typically, an inflammatory response is present to a variable degree. Embolization can result in severe tissue injury with ischemia and infarction.     

Do pre‐admonition suggestions moderate the effect of unbiased lineup instructions?

We examined the additive and interactive effects of pre‐admonition suggestion and lineup instructions (biased or unbiased) on eyewitness identification rates. Participants watched a mock crime video, completed a target‐absent lineup identification, and completed a retrospective memory questionnaire. Prior to attempting an identification, participants were either exposed or not exposed to pre‐admonition suggestions and received biased or unbiased lineup instructions. The pre‐admonition suggestion indicated that it was likely that the perpetrator was in the lineup (surely, you can pick the perpetrator). The pre‐admonition suggestion increased false identification in the unbiased lineup condition. Furthermore, those who received the pre‐admonition suggestion were more certain in their identifications as well as other testimony‐relevant judgments than were those who did not receive the pre‐admonition suggestion. These results suggest that pre‐lineup suggestion can mitigate the beneficial effects of unbiased lineup instructions.