Common law environmentalism

The necessity to control environmental externalities is almost invariably given as justification for command-and-control regulation and other forms of state intervention in related markets. When even mentioned, common law remedies that protected environmental rights for centuries are quickly dismissed as either being unworkable or ineffective. A review of the common law experience indicates that the rule of law can be effective in protecting environmental rights. Indeed, it is quite possible that common law was too effective, which led to special interest demand for statute law. The rule of politics may be more attractive to rent seekers than the rule of law and markets.     

Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs

Although the allure of consumption is the engine of globalization, political economists have tended to ignore varying consumer tastes as a potential source of beliefs about trade policy. This article develops a theory of trade policy preferences that adds the notion of varying consumer tastes to the standard labor-market application of the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model. The theory, which can explain trade preferences both across individuals and countries, is supported by an empirical analysis of survey data from 41 nations. Heavy consumers of exportables are found to be more protectionist than heavy consumers of imports and import-competing goods. Moreover, citizens in countries with expensive tradable goods see trade liberalization as a remedy to the rents they pay for protectionism. Other findings also support the more conventional labor-market side of the Heckscher-Ohlin model.     

Fiscal rules in the Canadian provinces: Abject failure or qualified success?

Most Canadian provinces have introduced legislation to require politicians of all ideological stripes to meet annual balanced budget (BB) targets. Critics of this type of legislation argue that it is unnecessary, confining, and subject to manipulation. We examine provincial balanced budget legislation before and after the Great Recession and argue that the response of provinces needs to be evaluated taking into account the multiple objectives of fiscal policy and the behavioural changes that the rules introduce, including creative non‐compliance. Rules should be evaluated on their ability to contribute to good fiscal governance rather than on their stringency.