Buddies or Burdens? Understanding the Al Qaeda Relationship with Its Affiliate Organizations

Drawing on organization theory, this article argues that al Qaeda seeks affiliates to expand the scope and scale of its operations, gain the benefits of greater local expertise, better spread innovations, and―most important―endow itself and its mission with greater legitimacy. The conventional wisdom on al Qaeda affiliates emphasizes these benefits and thus paints affiliation as a tremendous boon to al Qaeda that magnifies the danger of terrorism. However, al Qaeda faces a host of problems related to delegation and integration, and often affiliation is a net loss. Divergent preferences and priorities, branding problems, shirking at the local level, adverse selection, and costly control mechanisms all make affiliates of questionable value to the core organization. Although the danger al Qaeda poses may have morphed with the core declining and the affiliates rising in importance, the broader movement is probably less dangerous than it was when the al Qaeda core was at its height. US counterterrorism often magnifies these integration problems and, if done well, can further induce friction, discredit the brand, and otherwise throw sand in the gears. The broader study of al Qaeda and its affiliates also offers insight into the study of organizations in general.     

The Intelligence War on Terrorism

From 1941 to 1944, MI5 faced determined attempts to penetrate Allied Air Forces using trained pilot agents recruited by German Military Intelligence (Abwehr). The mission of these pilot agents was to gather military intelligence and to return to German held territory. This pattern of targeting Allied Air Forces has not been recognized by historians. This article examines MI5's responses to the threat using recently released files in the National Archives.     

The Homecomings: What Happens When Arab Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria Return?

What threat do foreign Arab jihadists returning from the war in Syria and Iraq pose to their home states and the broader Arab world? Foreign fighters come back as hardened veterans, steady in the face of danger and skilled in the use of weapons and explosives. While in the conflict zone, they will form networks with other radicals, embrace techniques like suicide bombings and beheadings, and establish ties to jihadists around the world. Different countries have different mitigating factors that limit the danger. The presence or absence of strong and focused security services is particularly important. Returnees' ambition, regional focus, lack of discipline, and brutality often mean they create more enemies than they vanquish and anger local populations. Most terrorism will be locally and regionally focused, with international terrorism probably less of a priority. Area regimes can reduce the risk of bleedout by hindering the travel of volunteers and constraining their ability to organize, stressing the internecine nature of the violence in the Sunni Muslim community, and developing effective de-radicalization programs. Regional and international cooperation to monitor and disrupt travel is also valuable. Many regimes, however, are also likely to take advantage of the jihadists' presence to gain more support from the United States, delay democratic reforms, and crackdown on non-jihadist opposition. Improving intelligence sharing and offensive counterintelligence is important, and the United States can play an important facilitating role.     

US counterterrorism intelligence cooperation with the developing world and its limits

The US struggle against global terrorist groups depends heavily on intelligence cooperation, particularly with developing world countries that are autocratic. This dependence creates many problems. Autocratic allies often have politicized security institutions to prevent a coup and maintain the regime in power. Services will be reluctant to cooperate on areas of high regime sensitivity. Internal communication and information sharing is poor, and security services are often pitted against one another. In addition, the regimes often lack democratic legitimacy, corruption flourishes by design, and many senior leaders are chosen for loyalty, not competence. American influence will be limited, and at times providing fewer resources may gain more influence than providing more assistance.     

The Decision to Begin Talks with Terrorists: Lessons for Policymakers

Governments have many means to begin a dialogue with terrorist groups. The offer of talks may lead terrorists’ constituents to reduce their support for violence, and moderates within a group itself may also turn away from violence. Despite these potential benefits, even the consideration of entering discussions carries many risks. Talks with U.S. officials do indeed reward the use of terrorism, tangibly demonstrating that groups can kill innocents and yet become legitimate interlocutors—a reward that is costly both in terms of reducing the prevalence of this tactic worldwide and because it inevitably angers local allies fighting the groups. Moreover, talks often fail in a variety of ways, giving the terrorists a breathing space to rearm and organize and leaving the government looking foolish. Because talks often fail, policymakers should carefully explore whether the conditions are right for any hope of success before they begin a dialogue.