Catching Cybercriminals: Policing the Internet

This article seeks to contribute to the existing debate(s) over the governance of cyberspace by focusing not upon legal frameworks, which have been already been the subject of much good work, but upon the enforcement of law. What is missing from much of the recent debate has been a substantive discussion of some of the practical problems of policing the Internet, such as by whom and how it should be (is being) policed. Such considerations are becoming increasingly important as the inhabitants of cyberspace multiply in number. It is argued that much of the debate over the policing of the Internet has tended to be driven by moral panics. As these panics subside it is becoming clear that there is clearly a confusion in the literature between the potential and actual harms that can be inflicted by cybercrimes. Consequently, we must be wary of reports which exaggerate the extent to which cybercrimes have proliferated, especially when those reports appear to originate from bodies who are currently engaged in the growing cybercrime industry. Furthermore, the legal problems appear to be less considerable as previously thought, especially with regard to the conflict of laws. This is not to say that there is not a problem, for there clearly is, but the article suggests that some of the undesirable behaviours will work themselves out, some will be eradicated by technology, whilst the remainder will continue to challenge our traditional understandings of crimes and deviant behaviours and the way that we police them. The first part of this article will look briefly at the growth of cybercrime: at what it is, who are the offenders and who are their victims. The second part will look at current models of policing the Internet and the third part will explore the appropriateness of the terrestrial policing model to the treatment of cybercrimes.     

Elderly widows and widowers and their coresidents in late 19th- and early 20th-century England and Wales

This article examines the family and household patterns of widowers and widows in England and Wales between 1891 and 1921 in terms of the proportion of widowers and widows who lived with never- or ever-married children, servants, or inmates, with nonrelatives only, or on their own. The absence of marked change between 1891 and 1921 in the frequency with which elderly widowers and widows lived with a married or never-married child are in line with the Laslett [J. Fam. Hist. 12 (1987) 263.] expectation that family patterns evolve only slowly, certainly much slower than the forces of political and economic change. Where changes can be detected, as in the decline in frequency of coresidence with servants or inmates, these changes were experienced by the younger as well as the older widowed and by married people. Apparently, the residence patterns of the elderly widowed changed due to the introduction of means-tested old-age pensions in 1910. A second investigated is the extent to which the socioeconomic environment influenced the residence patterns of the widowed in a given time period. The effect in general proves to be weak with little difference between one environment and another in the frequency with which widowers coresided with their children and evidence of gender balancing of the household (relatively more widows living with sons and more widowers with daughters) visible only in agricultural environments.     

Does Democratization Reduce the Risk of Military Interventions in Politics in Africa?

This article investigates whether there is an association between a trajectory of political liberalization, democratization, and military interventions. In what is arguably the ‘least likely case’ region in the world, this study analyzes the experience of 55 regimes in Africa between 1990 and 2004 and finds a striking regularity. Liberalizing, and in particular democratic, regimes have a significantly different track record of being subjected either to successful or failed military interventions. The analysis suggests that democratic regimes are about 7.5 times less likely to be subjected to attempted military interventions than electoral authoritarian regimes and almost 18 times less likely to be victims of actual regime breakdown as a result. Through an additional case study analysis of the ‘anomalous’ cases of interventions in democratic polities, the results are largely strengthened as most of the stories behind the numbers suggests that it is only when democratic regimes perform dismally and/or do not pay soldiers their salaries that they are at great risk of being overthrown. Legitimacy accrued by political liberalization seems to ‘inoculate’ states against military intervention in the political realm.