Indonesia Returns to the International Stage: Good News for the United States

Indonesia, the world's fourth largest country, third largest democracy and home to the world's largest community of Muslims, has returned to the international stage. Indonesia's membership in a number of important global communities-it resides physically in Asia but is part of the broader Muslim world, the developing world, and the community of democracies-makes it an important international actor. Many Americans assume that common democratic values will translate into shared foreign policy goals and cooperation between the United States and Indonesia. The two countries do share significant interests, such as counter terrorism, maritime security, and a wariness of China, but also hold starkly different positions on the Middle East peace process and global trade issues. Democracy provides opportunities for the two-thirds of Indonesians who hold anti-American views to influence foreign policy, making it costly for Indonesian leaders to cooperate with the United States. Indonesia's return is good news for America, but the relationship needs to be managed skillfully to maximize benefits for both sides.     

The Information Confrontation with Radical Islam

Information has emerged as a critical—potentially the decisive—front in both the global war with violent radical Islam and the overlapping but so far largely unadmitted Cold War with nonviolent radical Islam. In fact, the information front is undoubtedly the closest thing that al Qaeda has to a strategic center of gravity. Unfortunately, America faces an extremely hostile information environment in the Middle East and al Qaeda has proven far more effective at getting its message across than has the United States. A more effective U.S. information strategy would be one that stresses three themes: a democratic critique of radical Islam; an Islamic critique of radical Islam; and a critique of the crisis in Middle Eastern civilization. While these will not necessarily make the U.S. or its policies more popular, they may drive a wedge between radical Islam and potential supporters.     

Secrecy and the making of CFSP

Abstract

How can we understand the role of secrecy in the making of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)? This article analyses the nature of secrecy and questions some of the main assumptions surrounding the concept. In this respect, it argues that secrecy may be of functional necessity for policy-makers and actually compatible with good governance. Moreover, we must not put too much stock in transparency alone in that the relationship between secrecy and transparency is not zero-sum ? historically, transparency has sometimes been an instrument of control and domination. The article considers the case of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to shed light on what kind of secrecy exists in the foreign policy area, and argues that this is mainly a combination of functional and compound secrecy.     

Suffering What It Must? Mongolia and the Power of the ‘Weak’

Mongolia is not a hapless object on which the great powers may act at will. Like other small states existing on the periphery of great powers, Mongolia has—and does exercise—political agency. Its policies and actions affect not only the bilateral relationship it has with each of the greater powers, but—as an outgrowth of those bilateral relations—it also exerts some influence on the relationship that the great powers, in turn, have with each other. “… you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”¹     

Grand Strategy of ‘Restrainment’

With the end of the Cold War, the subsequent global war on terror, the global economic recession, and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, one would think that the United States would have formulated a grand strategy for dealing with these problems. This, however, is not the case. This article advances a grand strategy of “restrainment,” as a guiding concept for our approach to international politics. It builds from the principle that U.S. policy must seek to restrain—individually and collectively—those forces, ideas, and movements in international politics that create instability, crises, and war.     

The Middle East: Learning from the Past

The effort to bring peace to the Middle East has been an almost century long process. Legions of soldiers, politicians, and diplomats have attempted the political equivalent of transmuting dross into gold. They have failed; none more comprehensively than President Bill Clinton and his Middle East interlocutors. Despite personal energy, intelligence, and creativity, U.S. efforts failed. After a stretch of benign/malign neglect, Washington again is venturing into the swamp by sponsoring renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. There are learnable lessons from what has been (mis)managed in the past. The question remains whether the United States will take counsel from them.