Measuring Government Favouritism Objectively: The Case of Romanian Public Construction Sector

Government favouritism in the allocation of public funds raises costs for any society in which corruption prevails. Particularistic transactions can be identified in three different situations: uncompetitive awards of public contracts when there is only one “competitive” tender, when public money is spent on contracts supplied by politically connected firms, and a situation of capture in which one private contractor obtains a disproportionate share of contracts issued by some public agency. This present research has tested for the relevance of those three types of particularistic transactions that signal government favouritism as they apply to the Romanian construction sector for the period from 2007-2013, and to do so has made use of original public procurement databases. Furthermore, it will be proposed here that the “kickback”—a percentage of particularistic awarded values—can be used as a measurement of corruption. Even conservatively estimated, kickbacks account for much of the cost borne by any society that fails to eradicate corruption. For our purposes here, amounts of kickbacks at county level have been controlled against criminal convictions for corruption at county level. As a result, data analysis provides strong evidence that kickbacks based on particularistic allocation of public funds are indeed relevant in the measurement of corruption, and the steps used to evaluate kickbacks can be used just as well for other countries.     

Opening Public Officials’ Coffers: A Quantitative Analysis of the Impact of Financial Disclosure Regulation on National Corruption Levels

Disclosure of income, assets and conflicts of interest can serve as powerful public accountability tools to draw attention to the abuse of public office, help prosecute corrupt offenders and create a culture of scrutiny in the public sector that deters corruption. Based on data of the World Bank’s Public Accountability Mechanisms initiative, we present the first indicator that captures a country’s financial disclosure in-law effort. By employing different panel data model specifications, we use this indicator to measure how the introduction of comprehensive financial disclosure systems impacted national corruption levels for 91 countries between 1996 and 2012. We present robust results that provide tentative evidence for a positive and significant relationship between a country’s capacity to control for corruption and the expansion of financial disclosure legislation for the years following the enactment.     

Internal capabilities,external structural holes network positions,and knowledge creation

Social network theory suggests that firms bridging structural holes by connecting disconnected partners in a network benefit from timely access to diverse knowledge. However, the existing literature reports mixed evidence with regard to the performance implications of this view. Our study examines how a firm’s diverse knowledge base and knowledge-processing capabilities affect knowledge creation when a firm bridges multiple structural holes in an inter-firm network. The model is tested on a sample of 191 firms in high-technology industries. The dependent variable, knowledge creation, was measured by the number of patents generated. Results show that when a firm spans multiple structural holes, its diverse technological knowledge facilitates knowledge creation. However, when a firm already possesses well-developed knowledge acquisition capabilities, spanning structural holes reduces knowledge creation. This paper suggests that internal knowledge base and knowledge-processing capabilities determine the impacts of external network positions on firm knowledge creation. It provides implications on how a firm best capitalizes on external network positions.     

University reputation and technology commercialization: evidence from nanoscale science

We study how the scientific reputations and technology transfer policies of universities affect patenting by university researchers, with particular regard to whether they assign patent ownership to their university or to an outside firm. Using data on the career output of over 33,000 researchers in nanosciences, we find a strongly positive relationship of university reputation in nanosciences with the number of university-assigned patents, but almost a negligible association with firm-assignment of patents. University technology transfer office resources are related positively to both types of patents, but with diminishing returns. In contrast, the share of license revenue offered upfront to researchers is positively associated with university-assigned patents, but negatively related to firm-assigned patents. Taken together, our results suggest that universities that streamline their technology transfer efforts and improve their research reputation through support for basic research will see long-term success in technology commercialization.     

A legal perspective on university technology transfer

In the thirty-five years after passage of the Bayh–Dole Act of 1980, a robust literature has documented the emergence of university technology transfer as a critical mechanism for the dissemination and commercialization of new technology stemming from federally-funded research. Missing from these investigations, however, is what this paper terms the legal perspective, an understanding of how the law and its attendant mechanisms impact university technology transfer. Specifically, the paper reviews the extant legal scholarship and provides examples of how case law, legal structures, and the unique nature of intellectual property law affects technology transfer, as well as higher education policy and management. Throughout, we propose critical questions for future investigation, which serve to form a cross-disciplinary research agenda that can contribute fresh insights to scholarly and policy discussions related to the role of universities in economic and social development.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Designing the New American University</Emphasis> by Michael Crow and William Dabars: a primer for technology transfer academics,agencies, and administrators

You should read this book if you identify with one or more of the following groups. The first group is the academic readership of The Journal of Technology Transfer, mostly organizational economists and policy analysts, who should read the book because it presents some compelling ideas for research and theory. The second audience is the journal’s policy making readership concerned with return-on-investment from universities, who should view the institutional design process touted by the authors with skepticism. The third audience is comprised of university administrators, who might be inspired by the book to reevaluate what they’re doing structurally at their own institutions.     

Country level efficiency and national systems of entrepreneurship: a data envelopment analysis approach

This paper tests the efficiency hypothesis of the knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship. Using a comprehensive database for 63 countries for 2012, we employ data envelopment analysis to directly test how countries capitalize on their available entrepreneurial resources. Results support the efficiency hypothesis of knowledge spillover entrepreneurship. We find that innovation-driven economies make a more efficient use of their resources, and that the accumulation of market potential by existing incumbent businesses explains country-level inefficiency. Regardless of the stage of development, knowledge formation is a response to market opportunities and a healthy national system of entrepreneurship is associated with knowledge spillovers that are a prerequisite for higher levels of efficiency. Public policies promoting economic growth should consider national systems of entrepreneurship as a critical priority, so that entrepreneurs can effectively allocate resources in the economy.     

Determinants of the university technology transfer policy-mix: a cross-national analysis of gap-funding instruments

University–industry technology transfer (TT) has become increasingly institutionalized and is supported by numerous reforms and initiatives at the national, regional and university levels. Most countries have implemented a policy mix involving a range of instruments to support the commercialization of research. Still, there is no systematic evidence indicating why the mix of policy instruments differs between countries. This study offers a novel cross-national investigation of the policy mix emphasizing the level of centralization and decentralization of policy instruments. We map and analyze two specific types of public instruments aimed at addressing the so-called funding gap in TT: proof of concept programs (POCs) and university-oriented seed funds (USFs). Based on a survey across 21 European countries, we find that such instruments are widely used but are organized differently depending on the level of implementation of TT practices in the country and the specific type of instrument considered. More precisely, we find a U-shaped relationship between the use of centralized gap-funding instruments and the country’s implementation of TT practices. Moreover, the type of gap-funding instrument (POC or USF) moderates this relationship. We discuss the implications of our findings and suggest that the policy mix of gap-funding instruments evolve with the maturity of the national TT infrastructure.     

Innovative regulations,incomplete contracts and ownership structure in the water utilities

Using an incomplete contract framework, we analyse new forms of regulation and private participation in public services. This paper explains contractual efficiency in the absence of financially guaranteed investments in public private partnerships. The example of a number of African countries underlines how a series of national, normative law reforms can give rise to innovations in approaches to regulation. This new hybrid form of regulation, inspired by a French regulation approach combining commission regulation and franchise bidding, could be more effective than previous approaches to regulation, in the sense of being more stable and more closely aligned with stakeholder expectations. This approach to regulation would appear to be more efficient economically, while integrating the objectives of solidarity tariffs and social water access connections. Based on these analyses, our results show (1) the impact on the robustness of new lease contracts on financing constraints, and (2) the advantages of Asset Owner Companies that reconcile explicit commitments and special purposes. We demonstrate that this achieves optimum efficiency by encouraging parties to determine jointly the optimal level of costs and investment. In addition, the mechanism fosters discussion about the possibility of institutionalizing Asset Owner Companies by predetermining the distribution of risk in lease contracts.     

Corruption and hold-up: the role of intermediaries

Corrupt contracts are illegal and, therefore, vulnerable to hold-up. That is, a bureaucrat who has accepted a bribe from a firm in exchange for a license may still choose not to grant the firm that license (hold-up). This paper develops a model to study the role that intermediaries play in preventing hold-up. There are two types of firms, good firms that are legally entitled to receive a license, and harmful firms that are not. Without intermediaries only good firms enter the market, and harmful firms do not enter because of hold-up. Intermediaries are legally permitted to help firms reduce their navigation costs of obtaining licenses. Thus, intermediaries increase entry of good firms. However, by utilizing the legal aspects of their transaction with good firms as leverage against the bureaucrat, intermediaries can prevent hold-up among harmful firms. Thus, intermediaries increase participation by both good and harmful firms and their welfare costs are ambiguous. Data obtained from occurrences of violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act are broadly consistent with our model.