The Misquantification of Probative Value

D. Davis and W. C. Follette (2002) purport to show that when "the base rate" for a crime is low, the probative value of "characteristics known to be strongly associated with the crime ... will be virtually nil." Their analysis rests on the choice of an arbitrary and inopposite measure of the probative value of evidence. When a more suitable metric is used (e.g., a likelihood ratio), it becomes clear that evidence they would dismiss as devoid of probative value is relevant and diagnostic.     

Reviewers for Volume 27

Editorial Board

Reviewers for Volume 27     

Infant class sizes in the new admissions framework: a devolution of power

It was one of the major planks of the Blair government's legislative programme that it would set a limit on school class sizes for the youngest children. While the objective of reducing class sizes no doubt has much to recommend it from the point of view of raising educational standards, it is also inevitable that parental choice of school, already emasculated, will be limited even further. It is particularly likely to be borne out in practice wherever governing bodies and head teachers are insufficiently aware of the ramifications of all the other rules and regulations enacted alongside the ‘30 pupil’ limit. Nevertheless, it will be argued in this article that, if head teachers and governing bodies are prepared to persevere with the small print of the Act and the extraordinarily convoluted regulations and departmental Codes of Practice, circulars and guidance issued along with it, then there is a case for saying that the new infant class size limit can—when coupled with other changes in the law introduced by the School Standards and Framework Act (SSFA) 1998—sometimes be used as a tool both to increase the devolution of power down to individual schools and to improve parental choice     

Are Science and Religion Complementary Perspectives?

Eugene Goodheart provides an eloquent defense of the non-literalist, religious imagination before the aggressive atheism of several of today’s leading neo-Darwinists. But the position that he takes—that science and religion represent “complementary perspectives” serving different, yet equally permanent needs—is undermined by two fundamental problems. First, the claim that science can only tell us how the natural world works, while religion offers meaning, value, and moral guidance, may hold true when science is understood on the model of mathematical physics, but not when evolutionary biology and its derivatives are considered. Even Stephen Jay Gould, whose famous defense of science and religion as “nonoverlappling magisteria” resembles Goodheart’s, acknowledges that the case of evolutionary biology is profoundly different. Here evolutionary fact and moral values bleed together obscuring the boundary between science and religion. Second, religion and legacy of the religious imagination embedded in our culture, lose their ability to provide meaning, morals, and consolation when core elements of religious teaching are no longer believed to be true.

Lessons from European population genetic databases: comparing the law in Estonia, Iceland, Sweden and the United Kingdom

The advent of large-scale, population genetic databases (PGDs) in several countries around the world marks a significant development in human DNA banking and genetic research. The European countries that have led the way in the development of PGDs are Iceland, Sweden, Estonia and the U.K. In legal terms, the emergence of PGDs has been far from straightforward as such projects pose a range of difficult and complex issues for the law to address. This article canvasses the current law in Iceland, Estonia, Sweden and the U.K. on four fundamental issues of principle pertaining to PGDs, in order to illustrate the difficulties that have emerged around PGDs, highlight key areas of legal concern, and shed light on possible ways forward. It compares and contrasts the differing legal positions and lawmakers' responses to date in these four European countries that have established PGDs or are seeking to do so. The four fundamental issues examined are: (1) consent, especially for secondary research purposes; (2) ownership of biological samples, data and databases; (3) the rights of certain third parties to gain access to, and to use, PGD biological samples and data; and (4) benefit sharing, including the provision of feedback and genetic counselling to participants. This analysis may offer some guidance for policymakers in other jurisdictions where PGDs have been proposed or are being established.