The Decline and Fall of Democracy in Venezuela: Ten Theses

This paper presents an argument about the causes of the decline and fall of the 1958–1999 system of democratic politics, commonly known in Spanish as puntofijista , in Venezuela. Competing explanations of this process are evaluated, and an interim assessment of President Hugo Chávez and his political project is offered.     

Income,Democracy, and Leader Turnover

While some believe that economic development prompts democratization, others contend that both result from distant historical causes. Using the most comprehensive estimates of national income available, I show that development is associated with more democratic government—but mostly in the medium run (10 to 20 years). This is because higher income tends to induce breakthroughs to more democratic politics only after an incumbent dictator leaves office. And in the short run, faster economic growth increases the ruler's survival odds. Leader turnover appears to matter because of selection: In authoritarian states, reformist leaders tend to either democratize or lose power relatively quickly, so long‐serving leaders are rarely reformers. Autocrats also become less activist after their first year in office. This logic helps explain why dictators, concerned only to prolong their rule, often inadvertently prepare their countries for jumps to democracy after they leave the scene.     

Popular Mobilizations in Lebanon: From Anti-System to Sectarian Claims

In Lebanon, the Arab uprising is often analyzed through the lens of the side effects the Syrian uprising had on the country thanks to the massive refugee influx and involvement of Sunni and Shia Lebanese in Syria’s battleground. In fact, popular mobilizations happened prior to and during the current crisis as two different types of effects of the Arab uprisings at large. First, in late 2010 emerged an anti-sectarian movement that brought up an anti-system claim in line with other Arab social movements targeting authoritarian regimes and corruption. Second, the Sunni radical mobilization that started in Saida in 2011 around the popular Imam Sheikh Assir gathered resentments toward the Shia leading party Hizbullah as involved alongside the Syrian regime and, surprisingly, adopting an active minority mobilization strategy. Both movements conducted demonstrations of different types (from classic marches to on-road sit-ins) starting from a completely opposite perspective and in a very different environment: when the anti-sectarian mobilization faded, the sectarian one rose. This article will try to address the historical process of both mobilizations and assess their differences in light of several mobilization theories. It intends to raise questions about the types of actors involved, their discourses and justifications, and the contextual local and political environments.