Building successful technology transfer teams: A theory of cascading commitment

The attempt to transfer a technology from a publicly funded laboratory to a profit-oriented manufacturer can be a lengthy and complex process, involving several organizations and several key individuals within each organization. For example, a product technology transfer team may include the public lab itself, one or more end user organizations during product development and trial, a transfer agency, a public funding agency, the receptor manufacturer, and a private funding agency. Studies of such multi party transfers have suggested many factors that have contributed to their success or failure. We feel that most of these factors can be organized under the rubric of a more general theory of cascading commitment. Specifically, in this paper we propose that the likelihood of a transfer's success can be substantially affected by excellent management of the team building process by the public lab's R&D manager/director. Successful teams are built by gaining the commitment of appropriate individuals from appropriate organizations in a sequential cascading effect, by insightful and customized solicitation of each new team member to join at the appropriate stage of commercialization. To do this, the manager must be cognizant of, and individually appeal to, each new team member's perceptions of three sets of variables: evidence of the prior members' credibility, evidence of the prior members' commitment, and the set of personal benefits to be gained from participation.     

Is technology transfer more than a “mechanical” process?

Editorial Advisory Board     

The Evolution of the Office of Management and Budget Under President Reagan

This article introduces a series of retrospective articles on the Reagan administration. The Office of Management and Budget became a major actor in the budget debate over the last eight years. The Reagan administration has seen a change in OMB's role from that of an advisor to the president, to an agency with a central role to play in the development of the president's foreign and domestic policy within budgetary constraints. The article focuses on how OMB has reacted to these changes producing budget conventions and techniques unique to the 1980s.     

Pricing in the nuclear power industry: Public or private interest?

This paper tests empirically the Ramsey version of the public-interest theory of regulation by examining the pricing practices in the nuclear power industry, using a 1985 cross-sectional sample of 40 electric utilities. Other researchers have avoided this segment of the industry because of difficulties with nuclear fuel data, or perceived differences in the underlying production function. We show that regulators respond to political influences according to the Stigler-Peltzman version of regulation and that Ramsey pricing cannot be validated, at least for the nuclear segment of the electric power industry.