How much detail do we need to see? High and very high resolution photography,GAMBIT, and the Manned Orbiting Laboratory

This article examines the requirements for high and very high resolution photography of the USSR and other denied areas during the Cold War. It discusses the partial success of GAMBIT-1 and the much greater success of GAMBIT-3 beginning in 1966 in acquiring the former. The article reviews the development of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) in the same period to collect very high resolution photography, the rationale for it, and the major technical and financial problems the program soon experienced. It then describes the debate beginning in 1968 over the value of this imagery considering the MOL’s costs and the growing success of GAMBIT-3, and these and the other factors that led President Richard Nixon to cancel the program the following year.     

Liability, Responsibility and Blame: British Ransom Victims in the Mediterranean Periphery, 1860–81

Between 1865 and 1881 there occurred in southern Europe and the Balkans several cases of kidnapping in which British subjects were seized and held to ransom by brigands. Most ended peacefully (though expensively) with the negotiation and handing over of a substantial ransom, usually in gold, and the subsequent freeing of the hostage(s); one case, that of the so‐called ‘Marathon murders’ of 1870 in Greece, ended in tragedy. Quite apart from the problems these incidents created for the victims and their families, some kidnappings also raised important questions for the governments involved, notably who was to blame for such incidents, who was formally responsible for them, and — crucially — who was ultimately liable for the cost involved? These questions and the responses of British governments to them, culminating in 1881 with the enunciation by Gladstone's administration of a clear policy on such matters, form the core of this article.     

Credit Subsidy Reestimates, 1993–99

Projecting the losses and costs from federal credit assistance is difficult, and errors are inevitable. Although various incentives may exist for agencies to underestimate credit subsidies, the Congressional Budget Office's analysis of corrected reestimates does not reveal any pattern of bias in initial subsidy estimates. However, another problem was uncovered: the reestimates reported in the president's budget are in such disorder that analysts cannot rely on them. A few modest changes in current practice could reduce agencies' errors in preparing, reporting, and accounting for estimates and reestimates.     

The Purse Strings and the Policy Process: Bureaucratic Shaping of Industry Policy Capacity after 1945

Much literature in public administration debates the role of the public servant in the policy-making process. Some literature acknowledges an integral role of the public servant in the process. However, this role often remains obscure, due to being couched in abstract terms. The hierarchical structuring of responsibilities and power within bureaucracies imparts the capacity for differential influence. This paper provides a case study of the role of the Public Service Board (power over staffing) and the Australian federal Treasury (power over the purse) in the shaping of the bureaucratic structure. The case study centres on the industry policy bureaucracy in the volatile decade after World War II. In shaping the bureaucratic capacity, the Board and the Treasury exerted a discretionary influence on the policy process itself.