Transparency, Democratic Accountability, and the Economic Consequences of Monetary Institutions

Debates about the appropriate mix between autonomy and accountability of bureaucrats are relevant to numerous areas of government action. I examine whether there is evidence of a tradeoff between transparency, democratic accountability, and the gains from monetary delegation. I begin by presenting a simple theoretical model which suggests that central banks that are transparent, in the sense of publishing their macroeconomic forecasts, will find it easier to acquire a reputation. Despite making central banks more subject to outside scrutiny then, monetary transparency can lead to improved economic outcomes. I also consider arguments about the effect of accountability provisions involving parliamentary oversight and control over central bankers. The article then uses a new data set to examine these issues empirically, focusing on a natural experiment involving disinflation costs under different central banking institutions during the 1990s. Results suggest that countries with more transparent central banks face lower costs of disinflation while accountability provisions have no clear effect on disinflation costs. My results also concord with earlier findings that the effect of monetary institutions is conditional on other features of the political environment.     

Who's Responsible for the Economy? The Formation and Consequences of Responsibility Attributions

The concept of responsibility lies at the heart of theories of democratic accountability. This article represents the first attempt to explicitly model attributions of presidential versus congressional responsibility for the economy. The article investigates the extent to which contextual and individual-level factors influence citizens' attributions of responsibility for the economy and how, in turn, such judgments shape their political evaluations. Employing a multinomial probit model of attributional choice, I find that responsibility judgments are shaped to varying degrees by economic ideology, perceptions of institutional context, and partisanship, although the effects of partisanship are not uniform across political parties. The results demonstrate that responsibility attributions are politically consequential and moderate the effects of economic perceptions on presidential and congressional approval. Finally, the results suggest that the effects of responsibility attributions in the sanctioning process are not invariant across the target of institutional evaluation .     

Collaboration,information, and preservation: The role of expertise in farmland preservation task forces

Collaboration between agencies, private groups, and citizens in the field of natural resource management is generally seen as a productive strategy in challenging management situations. Collaborative management is particularly appealing in efforts like farmland preservation, which depend for their success on local initiative and support. However, such partnerships may create new dilemmas about the appropriate use of information in management. This paper analyzes the use of information by 15 county-wide Farmland Preservation task forces in the state of Ohio, U.S.A.     

Grant Levels and Debt Issuance: Is There a Relationship? Is There Symmetry?

Although previous work on fiscal federalism and grants has focused on the effects of grants on expenditures, no published research examines the impact of decreasing grants on state financing. This research addresses how decreasing levels of federal grant money to states affect states' long-term debt issuance, and whether the relationship is symmetric for increasing and decreasing grants. The model is tested with time series, cross-sectional data from 1984 to 1999. The results show that grants affect debt issuance, the effect is asymmetric, and direction of the effect differs for different types of debt issuance.     

Peeling Away the Populist Rhetoric: Toward a Taxonomy of Anti-Tax Ballot Initiatives

Scholars have devoted considerable attention to both the fiscal and policy impact of tax and expenditure limitation ballot initiatives. This article instead examines how statewide anti-tax measures come to be placed before the general public for popular votes. It critically assesses six anti-tax measures on statewide ballots in 1996, questioning the wisdom that they were populist undertakings. While tax crusaders continue to draw on grassroots themes and use populist rhetoric, there are important differences across the groups sponsoring the six anti-tax measures, including their organizational history, professionalization, membership, and sources of financial support.