Morris on Paternalism and Punishment

Law and Philosophy -     

The poverty reports,negative income taxation,and the constitution: an analysis and a compromise proposal†

Abstract. After some background discussion of the causes of and solutions to the problem of poverty, and an evaluation of the two recently published reports on this subject, the paper focuses on some political and economic constraints that are likely to be critical to the success of any proposal for a guaranteed annual income. Among these are the constitutional issue of who should control any GAI scheme, the relationship between a GAI and the present tax system, and the appropriateness of uniform guarantee levels across the nation. A compromise GAI scheme is then proposed which attempts to satisfy the relevant constraints, both economic and constitutional. Sommaire. Après une discussion préliminaire des causes de la pauvreté et de ses solutions possibles, ainsi qu'une évaluation des deux récents rapports sur le sujet, l'auteur étudie certaines contraintes politiques et économiques susceptibles de devenir des éléments critiques pour le succès de toute proposition de revenu annuel garanti. Entre autres, sont discutés, le probème constitutionnel du siège de l'autorité sur un plan de revenu annuel garanti, de la relation entre un tel plan et le présent système de taxation et de la désirabilité de niveaux unifonnes garantis à 1'échelle nationale. Enfin, un compromis est offert sous la forme d'un plan qui s'efforce de satisfaire les contraintes pertinentes de nature économique et constitutionnelle.     

Guilt Shall Not Escape or Innocence Suffer? The Limits of Plea Bargaining When Defendant Guilt is Uncertain

This article examines optimal prosecutor behavior with respectto plea bargaining when defendant guilt is uncertain. I showthat when jury beliefs and behavior are determined endogenouslyin equilibrium along with defendant and prosecutor behavior,plea bargaining can play only a limited role in managing society'sconflicting desires to maximize punishment of the guilty andminimize punishment of the falsely accused. In particular, whileit can be optimal for prosecutors to use plea bargaining toinduce a large fraction of guilty defendants to voluntarilysort themselves from the innocent, such sorting must come atthe cost of imposing relatively short sentences on such guiltydefendants who accept plea bargains.     

A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings

The holdout problem is commonly cited as the justification foreminent domain, but the nature of the problem is not well understood.This article models the holdout problem in a bargaining framework,where a developer seeks to acquire several parcels of land fora large-scale development. We show that in the absence of eminentdomain, holdouts are a significant threat, resulting in costlydelay. However, if the developer has the power to use eminentdomain to acquire the land from holdouts, all sellers will bargain,thus avoiding delay. An offsetting cost is that owners may negotiateprices below their true value, possibly resulting in excessivetransfer of land to the developer.     

Managing Equality in Social Dilemmas: Emotional and Retributive Implications

The equality rule is an important coordination rule in symmetric public good dilemmas. Although prior research emphasized that people use the equality rule out of efficiency concerns (as it helps to obtain the public good in the most efficient manner among group members), it may also reflect a true preference for fairness. More precisely, research examining emotional and retributive reactions as a result of a violation of the equality rule by a fellow group member showed that equality indeed is related to people’s personal values and what they consider to be fair. The present paper suggests that a violation of the equality rule results in emotional reactions, and these emotional experiences encourage further retributive actions. The different reactions following an equality violation are described as a function of three features: (1) the motives to use equality, (2) attributions for explaining the violation, and (3) the honesty of the given explanation. The write-up of this paper was partly supported by GOA/05/04 from the Research Fund of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. The research and write-up was supported by a fellowship of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO, Grant No. 016.005.019), awarded to the second author.