Examining Legislative Cue‐Taking in the US Senate

We examine congressional cue‐taking theory to determine its extent, conditionality, and various forms in the US Senate. Using a novel data‐collection technique (timed C‐SPAN footage), we focus on temporal dynamics via event history analysis. Examining the effects of senator characteristics across 16 votes from the 108th Congress, we find that committee leadership and seniority generally predict cue‐giving, while other types of characteristics predict cue‐giving on certain types of votes. Our results underscore the importance of considering the order and timing of voting when studying congressional behavior.     

Understanding public agency communication: the case of the Swedish armed forces

This article suggests a diagnostic framework of public communication intended to capture new communication strategies used by Armed Forces across Europe to legitimize new tasks and recruit new personnel. Three distinct communicative models that impact differently on democratic values and public support are suggested: an Old Public Administration (OPA) model influenced by bureaucratic values, a New Public Management (NPM) model fuelled by market values and a deliberative model labelled ‘New Public Service’ (NPS) that is largely influenced by proponents of ‘e‐democracy’. A case study of the communication of the Swedish Armed Forces identifies a lingering bureaucratic (OPA) ideal. The market ideal (NPM) however clearly dominates. The article concludes that communication along market purposes, principles and practices risks distancing Armed Forces further from society. Yet, an embryonic deliberative ideal (NPS)—much fuelled by the use of social media such as blogs—was also identified. This growing ideal holds the potential of infusing deliberative vigor into the organization and presumably facilitates the bridging of the gap to society. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How much detail do we need to see? High and very high resolution photography,GAMBIT, and the Manned Orbiting Laboratory

This article examines the requirements for high and very high resolution photography of the USSR and other denied areas during the Cold War. It discusses the partial success of GAMBIT-1 and the much greater success of GAMBIT-3 beginning in 1966 in acquiring the former. The article reviews the development of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) in the same period to collect very high resolution photography, the rationale for it, and the major technical and financial problems the program soon experienced. It then describes the debate beginning in 1968 over the value of this imagery considering the MOL’s costs and the growing success of GAMBIT-3, and these and the other factors that led President Richard Nixon to cancel the program the following year.