Terrorist Decision Making and the Deterrence Problem

An ongoing debate among policymakers and terrorism scholars concerns the effectiveness of deterrence as a counterterrorism tool. Absent from the debate is a discussion of the complex nature of terrorist decision making. Decisions are made at varying levels in a terrorist organization, often by actors having different motives, resulting in behavior that is not always fully rational. This article identifies several circumstances when terrorist behavior is not the product of an entirely unitary, rational decision-making process, and therefore highlights when deterrence policies will be least effective. It concludes with some policy implications for understanding when deterrence policies are most likely to succeed and how to address terrorism in other situations.     

TAIWAN AND HONG KONG: CHINA'S POLICIES AND PROSPECTS (Review Article)

The author defines state-building as a process of increasing the capabilities within a society for the benefit of its population, noting that, traditionally, in Afghanistan villages were run through consent, though the state has usually preferred force. He then examines the various factors said to inhibit state-building – geography, class, the warlords, ethnicity and political Islam – drawing relevant comparisons with other South Asian states. His conclusion is that it has indeed been most difficult to try to build a functioning state in Afghanistan, partly because of the war, but partly because force is no substitute for consent.     

The heart of Asia and the roof of the world

This article concentrates almost entirely on the events of 1971 and the author's involvement in the “sometimes complicated and frustrating negotiations and consultations” which led up to the signing at the end of 1971 of the various Treaties of Friendship as Britain withdrew from the Gulf, leaving behind a number of independent states, including the United Arab Emirates.     

The Effects of German Unification on the Federal Chancellor's Decision-Making

The purchase of Germany's Mannesmann AG by Britain's telecommunications holding company Vodafone in spring 2000 represented the first major cross-border hostile takeover in German corporate history. As spectacle, the story surrounding the fall of one of Germany's grandest industrial giants lays bare the underlying themes shaping the country's national discourse over how to build a new national consensus on the function of economic activity for the state, for society, and for the German citizen. As such, the Mannesmann-Vodafone saga contains a clear caesura between the Old and the New Economy in Germany. Of course the question remains which values and institutions do the Germans want to carry over from the old world into the new. And there the line between past and present becomes distinctly less discernible.     

Reviews

Jean‐Paul Deléage: Histoire de l'écologie — Une science de l'homme et de la natura. La Découverte, Paris, 1991.     

Toward a comprehensive homelessness‐prevention strategy

Abstract

Because of the misery and deprivation suffered by homeless persons, the initial response to homelessness in the United States focused first on quickly addressing the dire need for emergency food and shelter, and then on providing additional assistance to already homeless persons—ideally to help them move out of homelessness. New preventive measures to help people avoid becoming homeless were largely ignored or put off.¹ But now that efforts to provide emergency food and shelter are well under way throughout the country, many more experts, policymakers, and service organizations have begun focusing on homelessness prevention.² Nevertheless, actual prevention efforts are still tentative and somewhat haphazard. In support of a more rapid expansion of effective homelessness‐prevention activities, this paper discusses the benefits of prevention, develops an initial framework for a comprehensive homelessness‐prevention strategy, and, using this framework, evaluates existing prevention efforts and suggests new initiatives.