Egocentric Ethics

Ethical judgments are often egocentrically biased, such that moral reasoners tend to conclude that self-interested outcomes are not only desirable but morally justifiable. Although such egocentric ethics can arise from deliberate self-interested reasoning, we suggest that they may also arise through unconscious and automatic psychological mechanisms. People automatically interpret their perceptions egocentrically, automatically evaluate stimuli on a semantic differential as positive or negative, and base their moral judgments on affective reactions to stimuli. These three automatic and unconscious features of human judgment can help to explain not only why ethical judgments are egocentrically biased, but also why such subjective perceptions can appear objective and unbiased to moral reasoners themselves.     

The Dynamics of Capital Structure in Transition Economies

This paper uses a dynamic unrestricted capital structure model to examine the determinants of the private companies' target financial leverage and the speed of adjustment to it in two transition economies, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. We explicitly model the adjustment of companies' leverage to a target leverage, and this target leverage is itself explained by a set of factors. The panel data methodology combines cross-section and time-series information. The results indicate that the Bulgarian corporate credit markets were less supply -constrained than those of the Czech Republic during the period under investigation. Bulgarian?companies adjusted much faster to the target leverage than Czech firms. The speed of?adjustment related positively to the distance between target and observed ratio for Bulgarian companies while the relationship was neutral for Czech companies. The conservative policies of Czech banks and the exposure control were likely responsible for the slower adjustment among the larger companies while the opposite were true for Bulgarian banks and companies.     

The entrapment defense

Most American jurisdictions follow either asubjective or anobjective approach to the entrapment defense. In order to test some of the differences between the two approaches, student jurors viewed a videotaped cocaine trial and were presented with either subjective test or objective test instructions. The admission of prior conviction evidence was also varied. The jurors deliberated, returned a verdict, and then completed a questionnaire that measured their understanding of the instructions and trial facts. Results show that, first, juror comprehension of the principal features of the objective test is very poor. It is suggested that an effort be made to simplify instructions describing the objective test. Should simplification not improve comprehension, it is argued that the judge, not the jury, should decide the entrapment defense when the objective test is used. Second, admission of a prior conviction has a significant impact on verdicts in the subjective test condition, but not in the objective test condition. This finding suggests that the subjective test instructions are effective in encouraging jurors to use prior convictions as evidence of guilt. The content of the objective test instruction may also account for part of the difference in impact. Jurors in the objective test condition were instructed not to take the defendant's predisposition into account, and a substantial minority of the jurors under-stood this aspect of the instruction.     

Policy termination as a political process

The problem of how to terminate ineffective or outdated public policies, programs, or organizations is increasingly important. This paper argues that it is helpful to conceive of termination as a special case of the policy adoption process: there is a struggle to adopt a policy A, the substance of which is to eliminate or curtail policy B. The main distinguishing feature of this class of policy contests is the activity of vested interests who are able to advance a peculiarly powerful moral claim concerning the inequity or unfairness of change.     

Energy and social change: An historian's perspective

The dominant model for analyzing the relationship between energy and social change, the “technology assessment” model, is criticized for being technologically deterministic, over-ambitious and insensitive to the political and social context of technology development. Three “lessons from history” are offered:

1. A multiplicity of disciplines, world views and explanatory factors are required to fully understand the relationship between technology and social change.
2. The lack of historical understanding and explicative theory in this field call for modesty in attempts to quantify and predict social impacts.
3. More emphasis should be placed on developing an understanding of the process by which technology is developed and diffused through society.

     

Trade-offs implicit in child-support guidelines

Recent U.S. federal legislation required states to establish mandatory judicial guidelines for the setting of child-support awards. An equivalence-based approach is used to compare three formulae (two in use, one proposed) to three theoretical benchmarks, to clarify unavoidable trade-offs in the choice of a guideline.

1 Generally, the formulae in use leave children worse off economically than would the benchmark formulae.

Since the economic well-being of children cannot be separated from that of their custodial parent, that which most privileges children's welfare will usually privilege the custodial parent over the absent parent, and what appears more fair between the two adults may be less favorable to the children. Another possible trade-off is between children's welfare and work incentives: The guidelines that prescribe larger awards are those with higher implied marginal tax rates. Despite their work disincentive effects, the formulae with higher marginal tax rates are more favorable to children's economic interests.