Performance and Accountability: Budget Reform in New Zealand

Since 1984, New Zealand has made major changes in public sector management. This article describes the perceived problems with the previous New Zealand system and discusses the reforms designed to address these problems. The changes attempt to increase efficiency by: (1) separating commercial functions from other government operations; (2) strengthening lines of ministerial and executive accountability; and (3) designing budget and financial management systems to improve measurement of public sector performance. This last reform includes shifting from an input to an output-based system, changing from cash to accrual accounting, and creating different forms of appropriations for different types of government activities. While it is too early to assess whether the reforms are successful, we note potential problems.     

The provocative public sector: Domestic political protest and public sector growth in the OECD, 1965–1982

The results shown in Tables 1 through 8 above are consistent in that %GG is repeatedly shown to be significant whether making cross-national comparisons of DPP or predicting intra-national variations over time. Therefore, Hypotheses 1a and 1b are confirmed. The confirmation of Hypotheses 2a and 2b shows that, taking into account public sector size, government growth is most provocative in countries where it represents a major socio-economic change (i.e., where the public sector is small). Government growth has a neutral impact where the role of the public sector is long-established (i.e., where the public sector is large).Hypotheses 3a and 3b posited that average and annual rates of economic growth would be inversely associated with domestic protest. These hypotheses, too, were confirmed. The belief that economic growth rates would clearly provide the margin of affordability for public sector growth was not confirmed, as the coefficient of the interaction term (%GG*%GDP) was not statistically significant.     

The Growth of Government: Sources and Limits

Theories of the size of government focus on either the demandfor government or the supply of tax revenues. Demand sidetheories such as those of Peltzman, Meltzer and Richard,Husted and Kenny, and Lott and Kenny are essentially politicaltheories. They emphasize the role of voters or interest groupsin expanding government. Supply side theories such as those ofKau and Rubin, Baumol, West, and Ferris and West emphasize theability of government to collect taxes. In this paper, wecombine both demand and supply side theories. For demand, weuse the Poole-Rosenthal time series data on the ideology ofCongress, on the theory that all political forces mustultimately express themselves in voting which is measured byideology. For supply, we use the Kau-Rubin measures of theability of government to collect taxes as a function of thedeadweight costs of tax collection and ability of individualsto hide revenues. We find that female labor forceparticipation and the associated ability to tax femaleproductivity is the most important factor associated withgovernment, and it alone explains about 60% of the actualgrowth of government. The ideology of the Senate is alsosignificant, but has a small effect. This paper may be thefirst to examine the influence of ideology on the time path ofa policy; other research examining ideology (including ours)has been cross sectional. Further research on the role ofideology in changing policies over time is clearly warranted.     

Pricing public sector services: The tuition gap

The large gap between the tuition charged by public colleges and universities and private ones is likely to cause severe disruptions to the private sector institutions of higher education. If it continues, private sector institutions may once again become bastions for students who can afford their services, rather than for those who merit them, and these institutions will diminish in size and diversity as well. Public sector institutions will become relatively stronger - not solely for reasons of effectiveness, efficiency, or equity - but because of the competitive advantage that the tuition gap affords them. This paper explores the feasibility and desirability of the three methods of correcting this problem, using real cost and demand data from the University of Massachusetts for illustrative purposes. It concludes the subsidization of students (rather than institutions) and raising public sector tuitions are two possible alternatives to the present tuition gap.