The bureaucracy and public policy: Canadian merger policy and the Combines Branch, 1960–71

Abstract. This paper investigates the implications for public policy in general and merger sections of the Combines Act in particular of the hypothesis that bureaus, when carrying out their administrative duties, attempt to maximize their private utility functions rather than the social utility function expressed in the legislation. The analytical procedure, given alternative utility goals of power, prestige, convenience, and security and the appropriate constraints, is to predict the behaviour of the Combines Branch (from 1960–71) and to test these predictions against actual Branch behaviour. The evidence on the Branch's behaviour (all cases prosecuted and discontinued) suggests that its conduct can be better explained by security maximization than by any alternative private or altruistic goal. However, it is not clear that this was a bad thing for public policy because it can be argued that the Branch's behaviour brought public policy in this area closer to the social welfare function implied in the legislation than would have been the case if the government had successfully maximized its private utility function. Sommaire. L'auteur de cet exposé enquête sur les implications, pour la politique publique en général et les articles sur le fusionnement de la loi sur les coalitions en particulier, de l'hypothèse suivant laquelle es bureaux, dans l'exercice de leurs responsabilités administratives, essaient de maximiser leurs fonctions privées plutôt que leur fonction sociale, telle qu'elle est indiquée dans la législation. La procédure analytique, étant donné le choix des buts: pouvoirs, prestige, commodité et sécurité, avec Ies limites appropriées, consiste à prédire le comportement du service chargé des coalitions (de 1965 à 1971) et à vérifier ces prédictions à la lumière de son comportement réel. Les faits relatifs au comportement de ce service (tous les cas amenés en justice et ceux qui ont été abondonnés) indiquent qu'il s'explique plus par une maximisation de la sécurité que par tout autre motif privé ou altruiste. Il ne semble pas cependant que cela ait été néfaste à la politique publique parce que l'on peut argumenter que le comportement du service a fait jouer à la politique publique un rôle plus orienté vers le bien-être social, comme cela était sous-entendu dam la législation, que ce n'aurait été le cas si le gouvernement avait maximisé avec succès sa fonction privée.     

China, Nuclear Security and Terrorism: Implications for the United States

This article outlines Chinese strategic nuclear forces and the Chinese philosophical approach to nuclear security. It then focuses on the domestic conditions in China which could precipitate vulnerabilities to its nuclear forces. From information about internal security conditions in China, specific internal threats to Chinese nuclear security will be derived. Based on these threats, several outsider and insider scenarios will be outlined involving a variety of terrorist or terrorist related behaviors. These notional scenarios will include everything from overrun or attack, to diversion, to cyber terrorism, to sabotage. The article will then cover what these scenarios and the possible Chinese reaction to them may mean for the security, military and diplomatic strategies of the United States.     

Reassessing U.S. Strategy in the Aftermath of the Korean War

This article examines the reassessment of U.S. strategy that Dwight D. Eisenhower directed after replacing Harry S. Truman in the White House in January 1953, as he worked to bring the Korean War to an end and then confronted the problems remaining in its aftermath. Despite much of the rhetoric of the early Eisenhower administration, the outcome of that reassessment fit more closely the objective of containment than key strategic formulations of its predecessor. Why was this so? How did the orientation apply to ending the war in Korea and sustaining the U.S. position there and elsewhere after the armistice? What insights, if any, do the process of reassessment and its outcome provide for the present? Answers to these questions serve to emphasize the dynamic and contingent nature of American strategy in the early Cold War and the importance of flexible, engaged leadership in the White House.     

The Effects of German Unification on the Federal Chancellor's Decision-Making

The purchase of Germany's Mannesmann AG by Britain's telecommunications holding company Vodafone in spring 2000 represented the first major cross-border hostile takeover in German corporate history. As spectacle, the story surrounding the fall of one of Germany's grandest industrial giants lays bare the underlying themes shaping the country's national discourse over how to build a new national consensus on the function of economic activity for the state, for society, and for the German citizen. As such, the Mannesmann-Vodafone saga contains a clear caesura between the Old and the New Economy in Germany. Of course the question remains which values and institutions do the Germans want to carry over from the old world into the new. And there the line between past and present becomes distinctly less discernible.     

Innovation or Inertia: The U.S. Military and the Learning of Counterinsurgency

Following its encounter with insurgent violence in Iraq, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has sought to improve the U.S. military's ability to conduct counterinsurgency. This effort suggests a potential turning-point in the history of the U.S. military, which has traditionally devoted its attention and resources to “high-intensity” or “conventional” combat. Given this institutional culture, what are now the prospects of the U.S. military ‘learning counterinsurgency’? In many ways, the ongoing reorientation is promising and targeted, informed directly by the U.S. campaign in Iraq. At the same time, Pentagon priorities still reveal a remarkable resistance to change, and this in spite of the radically altered strategic environment of the War on Terror. Given this intransigence - and the eventual fall-out from the troubled Iraq campaign - the ongoing learning of counterinsurgency might very well fail to produce the type of deep-rooted change needed to truly transform the U.S. military.     

History, War, and the Future

This article aims to delineate several issues raised by an historically based approach to understanding the present and the future. Beginning with a discussion of the profound impact that drastic changes have had on the international environment, the article then outlines what history suggests about human nature's influence on the course of future events; the future of war; the nature of governance and the United States. This essay does not attempt to provide answers, but rather suggests how policy makers, strategists, and military leaders might think through the complex political and cultural questions they need to be asking in the making of strategy. This is the essential first step for Americans. If they fail to ask the right questions, most answers will prove irrelevant to the challenges of the future.     

Delegation of American Foreign Policy Council Visits China

At the invitation of Chinese Association for International Understanding （CAFIU）, a 6-member delegation of American Foreign Policy Council headed by Mr. Peter Pace, former Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited China from June 4 to 11.