Air and Space Power, Lead Turning, the Future

To optimize security investment for the future, the Department of Defense (DoD) should adopt an approach that rewards the services for developing innovative methods to attain national security objectives with the least risk in both blood and treasure. To accomplish this, the DoD may have to re-visit its former practice of providing each service with relatively equal slices of the military budget. Under such an approach, the services are motivated to make incremental changes to the concepts and weapons of the previous war and have little reason to take risks to increase productivity of man and machine alike. What is needed—particularly in these times of increasingly complex national security challenges, rising costs, and shrinking budgets—is a plan for going forward that is centered on a shared vision of the variety of threat conditions we are likely to face, an honest evaluation of their significance, and a mature appraisal of what will be required to deal with them. We should dedicate ourselves to crafting an overall defense strategy that will allow us to shape the environment and act flexibly across the entire range of operations, and that will also provide a framework upon which to base our jointly focused resource and investment decisions.¹     

A comparison of methods used in the UK and Ireland for the extraction and detection of semen on swabs and cloth samples

The recent formation of a United Kingdom and Irish working group, the Body Fluids Forum (BFF), highlighted the need to investigate different working practices prior to any inter-laboratory comparison work and identification of best practice. Various dilutions of semen were seeded onto swabs and cloth samples for each BFF member laboratory to test using their standard techniques. The results showed that the detection of acid phosphatase on swabs is best achieved using direct testing rather than on an extract from the swab. Extraction methods for spermatozoa require a balance to be achieved between using a sufficient volume of water to ensure optimal release and minimal volume to ensure a concentrated extract. PSA tests were investigated and found to be more sensitive than Choline. DNA profiles were obtained from samples in which no spermatozoa had been detected during microscopic examination.     

Peak blood-ethanol concentration and the time of its occurrence after rapid drinking on an empty stomach

Healthy men, 20 to 60 years old, drank a moderate dose of ethanol in the morning after an overnight fast. They consumed either neat whisky in amounts corresponding to 0.34, 0.51, 0.68, 0.85, or 1.02 g of ethanol per kilogram of body weight or 0.80 g/kg ethanol solvent diluted with orange juice. The peak blood-ethanol concentration (BEC) increased with the dose administered, but the time required to reach the peak was not markedly influenced over the range of doses studied. At a dose of 0.68 g/kg, the peak BEC ranged from 52 to 136 mg/dL (N = 83), and slow absorption (a late-occurring peak) produced a lower peak BEC. The peak BEC was reached between 0 and 45 min for 77% of the subjects (N = 152) and between 0 and 75 min for 97% of them. The time of peaking in venous blood occurred, on average, 10 min later than in capillary (fingertip) blood although the peak BEC was not appreciably different; the mean venous BEC was 97.0 mg/dL (range, 76 to 112 mg/dL), and the mean capillary BEC was 99.6 mg/dL (range, 75 to 123 mg/dL). When subjects drank 0.80 g/kg ethanol diluted with orange juice over 30 min, the average BEC increment between the end of drinking and the peak was 33 mg/dL (range, 0 to 58 mg/dL). The rate of absorption of ethanol was 1.78 mg/dL/min (range, 0.52 to 4.8 mg/dL/min), and the peak BEC occurred within 60 min after the end of drinking in 92% of the trials. The largest BEC increment (mean, 21 mg/dL; range, 0 to 44 mg/dL) was seen during the first 15 min after the drinking period.     

Roosevelt, Truman and the Development of Postwar Grand Strategy

After its victory in World War II, it was clear that United States should move beyond the disastrous policies of the 1930s, but it was less clear how. Ultimately, a lasting postwar strategy was forged under President Truman. Appreciating how Truman moved well beyond Roosevelt's guiding assumptions is essential to understanding the evolution of American grand strategy. One sees that wartime planning and grand strategy formulation can prove quite inadequate for dealing with postwar challenges. An administration cannot be locked into assumptions, but must constantly test them. Thus, the Truman administration eventually developed and adopted containment and moved far beyond FDR's approach. More substantively, the fundamental geopolitical lesson of World War II and the early Cold War was that the United States must assume the essential balancing role relative to other major powers.     

The Global Era of National Policy and the Pan-Oceanic National Fleet

This article develops a framework for considering the future requirements for U.S. maritime power. It does so by proposing that these requirements must be considered within the context of an integrated National Fleet—the combined capabilities of the three “Sea Services”—the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard. It also would include their reserve components, as well as the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the Maritime Administration's Ready Reserve Force (RRF)—the two organizations responsible for maintaining the nation's strategic sealift fleet.