Testing the relative importance of contemporaneous offenses: The impacts of fear of sexual assault versus fear of physical harm among men and women

Purpose

The current study tests the shadow of sexual assault hypothesis and extends recent research by examining whether the fear of physical harm or the fear of sexual assault has a greater impact on fear of other crimes.

Methods

To determine the unique interaction between gender and fear, we conduct separate analyses among men and women.

Results

While fear of physical harm and fear of sexual intrusion are both predictive of fear of home invasion, robbery, and murder, fear of physical harm has a significantly greater impact across all types of fear (e.g., home invasion, robbery, murder).

Conclusions

Despite previous empirical evidence that suggests fear operates differently among men and women, our findings suggest that fear of physical harm - rather than fear of sexual intrusion - is a more robust predictor of fear of crime among both men and women.     

The ‘Right to be Forgotten’ – Worth remembering?

In the last few years there has been a lot of buzz around a so-called ‘right to be forgotten’. Especially in Europe, this catchphrase is heavily debated in the media, in court and by regulators. Since a clear definition has not emerged (yet), the following article will try to raise the veil on this vague concept. The first part will weigh the right’s pros and cons against each other. It will appear that the ‘right to be forgotten’ clearly has merit, but needs better definition to avoid any negative consequences. As such, the right is nothing more than a way to give (back) individuals control over their personal data and make the consent regime more effective. The second part will then evaluate the potential implementation of the right. Measures are required at the normative, economical, technical, as well as legislative level. The article concludes by proposing a ‘right to be forgotten’ that is limited to data processing situations where the individual has given his or her consent. Combined with a public interest exception, this should (partially) restore the power balance and allow individuals a more effective control over their personal data.     

The ITS Directive: More than a timeframe with privacy concerns and a means for access to public data for digital road maps?

Roads are ever more congested, pollution keeps rising and traffic-related deaths remain at unacceptable levels. It is clear that society’s needs with regard to transportation and mobility have become unsustainable. Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) are often heralded as a potential solution to this problem, yet have still to yield tangible results. The EU has, however, adopted the ITS Directive, aiming for an EU-wide implementation of ITS solutions. Three questions are raised. First, can the ITS Directive really provide for the required substantial provisions in this field? Second, as ITS solutions are often deemed to be pervasive and intrusive, how does the ITS Directive interact with the EU legal framework on privacy and data protection? Third, given the involvement of private commercial entities in the field of providing road, traffic and travel data, can a public–private partnership be found to allow for the re-use of both public and private sector data in ITS solutions?     

Five years of the APEC Privacy Framework: Failure or promise?

The APEC Privacy Framework was developed from 2003, adopted by APEC in 2004 and finalised in 2005. It was intended as a means of improving the standard of information privacy protection throughout the APEC countries of the Asia–Pacific, and of facilitating the trans-border flow of personal information between those countries. In 2007 a number of ‘Pathfinder’ projects for cross-border data transfers were launched under the Framework. In the five years since the process commenced, what has it achieved, and what is it likely to achieve? This paper argues that the APEC Privacy Framework has had many flaws from its inception, including Privacy Principles that are unnecessarily weak, and no meaningful enforcement requirements. Since its adoption in 2004, little attempt has been made to encourage its use as a minimal standard for privacy legislation in developing countries (which might have been useful), and it is having little impact on the significant number of legislative developments now taking place.