The (in)significance of genocidal behavior to the discipline of criminology

Though scholars devoted to the discipline of criminology purport to be theoretically and pragmatically exhaustive with respect to their research on ``crime,' the study of genocide, an offense prohibited by international criminal law, has been virtually ignored. Nevertheless, the obligation to research genocidal behavior seems critical because of the comprehensive and threatening nature of the offense. Clearly, the consequences of genocide are more ominous than any single violation of domestic statutory law. Presentations at two annual criminal justice conferences and papers published in 13 prestigious periodicals devoted to the discipline of criminology are examined between 1990 and 1998. Content analyses demonstrate the reluctance of the discipline of criminology to identify the crime of genocide as one worthy of scholarly attention. These findings and the future of the discipline of criminology are assessed in light of the unequivocal danger posed by genocidal behavior.     

The revolutionary model of Dr William L. Pierce

This essay explores the revolutionary model propounded by the late Dr William L. Pierce, the founder of the National Alliance. Pierce was keenly aware of the opposition arrayed against his movement and thus outlined a strategy that he saw as viable under current conditions. Although his National Alliance organization was large by American far right standards, it still constituted a relatively small movement. Furthermore, Pierce assumed that the mainstream media were generally hostile to his message. Thus Pierce developed a revolutionary strategy to take these and other factors into account. Although no previous single source fully captured his revolutionary strategy, this essay surveys his previous writings and broadcasts so that his model comes into clearer focus.     

Propaganda and United States foreign policy: The case of panama

Abstract

This paper probes the use of propaganda by the U.S. government as a device for generating domestic public support for its invasion of Panama. The findings indicate that the government did succeed in influencing domestic public opinion. What accounted for the success? First, through the propaganda technique of selection, the U.S. government carefully chose those “facts” that supported its predetermined objective of removing General Manuel Noriega from power. Concomitantly, it concealed the information that would have undermined the veracity of its story: (1) the fact that Noriega was its Frankenstein monster; (2) its poor record on democracy in Panama; (3) the fact that there was no serious threat to American lives or interests; (4) the enormous human and material carnage occasioned by the invasion; and (5) the various violations of international law. Further, the traditional sources of public influence—the Democratic party, major opposition party to the Republicans, and the American press—failed to provide competing perspectives. In fact, they joined the government's propaganda bandwagon. The result was that the American public became convinced that the Bush administration's “official story” was the truth.     

Cruise‐ship terrorism and the media

Abstract

An attempt is made to analyze physical differences between the Achille Lauro incident and seizure of hostages on board aircraft, for their impact on terrorist use of the news media. Among the important differences considered are the following: the number of hostages, the range and endurance of the transportation vehicle, the possibilities of disappearing into the unknown, the degree of “de facto torture” in the physical situation of the hostages, the ease of media (especially television) access, the general accessibility of the vehicle for rescue efforts, and the sheer novelty of this mode of terrorist attack. Some analogies are drawn with terrorist seizures of railroad trains and buses, including comparisons of media behavior.