Acute and subacute fetal CO-poisoning

The main principles of placental CO exchange in cases of CO intoxications of pregnant women are shown. Fetal COHb lags behind maternal COHb by several hours depending on the exposure pattern. During CO elimination the fetal COHb levels again lag behind the mother's. A case of a lethal CO intoxication of a pregnant woman, mens IX, with exposure time of 10-12 h and COHb of 75% for the mother and 46% for the fetus allows to make conclusions about process of intoxication and about different times of death for mother and fetus. In highly acute lethal intoxications of the mother COHb in fetal blood is low or negative. A vital danger of the fetus is not probable when mother survived a short CO exposure.     

Attorney general’s task force on violent crime--1981 three recommendations for legal reform in the criminal justice system

In the spring of 1981 Attorney General William F. Smith appointed a Task Force on Violent Crime with the assignment to report to him concerning specific ways in which the federal government could do more to assist in controlling violent crime without limiting its efforts against organized crime and white-collar crime. The Task Force submitted their final report which contained 64 recommendations. Three of the recommendations concerned the insanity defense, the exclusionary rule and habeas corpus actions.The purpose of this paper is to consider each of these three subjects with regard to their effect on national policy concerning the criminal justice system. In addition each recommendation is discussed with regard to the current status of the law in these areas and proposed congressional legislation on each subject. Further, where applicable, state legislation and federal and state judicial decisions relating to each subject are identified and discussed.In addition to legislation and judicial decisions, selected articles, text books, newspapers, news magazines, and statements by government officials were also utilized as resource material in preparing the article.The Task Force recommended a new option concerning the insanity defense, that of guilty but mentally ill. Concerning the exclusionary rule the Task Force recommended a good faith exception to the rule. With regard to habeas corpus actions, the Task Force recommended several procedural changes including a statute of limitations and a “cause and prejudice” requirement to support federal habeas corpus action. This article supports the recommendations of the Task Force and concerning the insanity defense and exclusionary rule suggests that both should be abolished.     

Regulation and the redistribution of income and wealth

Abstract: Government regulation may be instituted to alter the distribution of income and wealth just as it may be instituted to remedy market failures and hence improve allocative efficiency. Consistent with what has been called our “nascent genius in redistribution.” Canada has made extensive use of regulation as a technique to redistribute income - even where it may not have been established with that purpose mainly in mind. As a governing instrument, regulation is attractive to politicians because it provides a means of effecting redistribution in a disguised form. Its major advantage is that the transfers do not pass through the usual tax and expenditure process. In the case of direct regulation we show that income may be redistributed in at least three ways: from consumers to producers; from one group of consumers to another within the regulated market; and regulation may be used to prevent, delay or alter distributional shifts stemming from market forces. We provide considerable empirical evidence to document the use of regulation to redistribute income from consumers to producers (i.e., supply management marketing boards, trucking, taxis), and among consumer groups through cross-subsidization (e.g., airlines, telephones). Less emphasis has been given to the role of redistribution in social regulation. We describe how health. safety and environmental regulation can be viewed in distributional terms. In particular, we examine the close connection between social regulation and the creation of rights which are inherent in the individual and which are to be removed from market decision-making. Finally, we discuss some of the implications of using regulation to redistribute income: rent-seeking behaviour which converts transfers to social wastes; the creation of barriers to deregulation as the recipients of regulatory transfers seek to protect them; and the high social costs of using this method of redistributing income. Sommaire: Le but de la réglementation gouvernementale peut êre de changer la distribution du revenu et de la richesse comme de remédier aux carences du marché et d'améliorer ainsi la répartition. Fidèle à ce que l'on a appelé notre “génie inné pour la redistribution”, le Canada s'est beaucoup servi de la réglementation comme technique de redistribution du revenu — même là où ce n‘était pas son objectif principal. Comme instrument de gouvernement, la réglementation plaît aux hommes politiques, parce qu'elle leur donne un moyen d'assurer la redistribution sans en avoir l'air. Son principal avantage est d'assurer les transferts sans les faire passer par le processus de la fiscalité et des dépenses. Dans le cas de la réglementation directe, nous montrons que le revenu peut être redistribué dau moins trois façons: des consommateurs aux producteurs; d'un groupe de consommateurs à un autre à l'intérieur du marché réglementé; enfin, la réglementation peut servir à prévenir, retarder ou modifier les déplacements et la distribution provenant des mouvements du marché. Nous offrons toutes sortes de preuves empiriques documentant l'usage de la réglementation dans le but de redistribuer le reyenu des consommateurs aux producteurs (par exemple la question des approvisionnements, les conseils de mise en marché, le camionnage, les taxis) et à l'intérieur des groupes de consommateurs par l'inter-subventionnement (par exemple les compagnies déiennes, les té1éphones). Nous avons moins insisté sur le rôle de la redistribution dans la réglementation sociale. Nous décrivons cependant comment la réglementation dans le domaine de la santé, de la sécurité et de l'environnement peut être envisagée sous l'angle de la distribution. Nous examinons en particulier le rapport étroit entre la réglementation sociale et la création de droits inhérents à l'individu et devant échapper au pouvoir décisionnaire du marché. Finalement, nous discutons de certaines des conséquences de l'usage de la réglementation pour redistribuer le revenu: le comportement orienté vers la recherche d'une rente qui fait de certains transferts du gaspillage social, la création d'obstacles à la déréglementation lorsque les prestataires de transferts réglementés essaient de les protéger et les coûts sociaux élevés de cette méthode de redistribution du revenu.