The Israeli criminal justice system in action—Is justice administered differentially?

This study focuses on two major junctures in the Israeli criminal justice system, the preadjudication stage and the trial stage. The data are gathered from records accumulated during the period 1980 through 1992. For each year between 1980 and 1992, a random sample of 3637 persons, who had their first police contact that year, was drawn from the computerized central file at Israeli Police Headquarters. A total of 40,007 individuals, with a total of 97,000 records, constituted the study population. The results identify which criminal records were most likely to be terminated prior to adjudication and which records, once adjudicated, were most likely to conclude in conviction. Major emphasis was placed on the issue of nationality—being an Arab or a Jew—while the effect of other variables, such as the type of offense and the time period, were controlled. The criminal justice system was found to be less discriminating at the early stages of the criminal process, but as the offender moved along the process, the chances that nationality would play an important part increased. Authors are listed alphabetically and contributed equally to the writing of this paper.     

Religious and Ideological Dimensions of the Israeli Settlements Issue: Reframing the Narrative?

Whether or not it will be possible to relocate settlers from the "territories" depends not just on the willingness of the relevant Israeli officials to authorize evacuation of some or all of the West Bank and Gaza given the violence it may cause, but especially on the thinking and the changing attitudes of the settlers themselves. Only by understanding the views of the current settlers — their motivations, their beliefs, and the differences among them — will it be possible to formulate a sensible relocation strategy. That was the focus of the conference's first panel.     

On the employment effect of noncompliance with the minimum wage law

A major result of the economic literature on minimum wage noncompliance is that a competitive employer who opts not to comply with the minimum wage law will employ less labor than he would have in the absence of a law. The reason for this is that noncompliance entails the risk of getting caught and punished, consequently raising the marginal cost of labor to the employer. An implicit assumption underlying this result is that noncompliance does not affect the free market wage rate facing the competitive employer. The present note shows that noncompliance will bring about a fall in the market wage rate and that if employers and workers are risk neutral, the market wage rate will fall in a way that leaves the marginal cost of labor intact. Consequently, the enactment of a minimum wage law, if not accompanied by sufficient enforcement to induce compliance, will have no effect on the level of employment.