A Poisson model of incidents of international terrorism in the United States

Abstract

Various haphazard, and often uncoordinated, efforts have been devoted to discouraging and combatting terrorism. Unfortunately, there has been a noticeable lack of quantitative studies of the problem of terrorism. Nevertheless, it can be expected that the problem of international terrorism will eventually be a focus for operations researchers. A factor fundamental to any OR study is an understanding of the underlying generating process for incidents of terrorism. Based on incidents of terrorism from 1968 to 1974, this paper notes that the Poisson is a good model for the occurrence of incidents of international terrorism in the United States. Results of both chi‐square and Kolmogorov‐Smirnov tests are presented. Finally, an unusual result, inconsistent with popular beliefs, is noted.     

Francis Fukuyama and the Origins of Political Order and the State: A Historical Critique

This essay examines the model of state development put forward by Francis Fukuyama in his book, The Origins of Political Order. It argues that the evolutionary model used by Fukuyama experiences problems when it comes to dealing with specific historical examples. Its emphasis on the Qin state as the “first modern state” places an excessive emphasis on coercion and violence as the basis of the state. It attempts to relegate Rome to being equivalent to a chiefdom to fit it into his model whereas in reality Rome evolved differently to China and relied much more on cooperation and networks. England after 1688 provides another example of how Fukuyama's model is deficient. On this basis the paper argues that a universal evolutionary model is insufficient to explain political development and it is more appropriate to begin analysis with real political societies.     

Strategic Party Government: Party Influence in Congress, 1789–2000

Why does the influence of Congressional parties fluctuate over time? Building on prevailing answers, we develop a model, Strategic Party Government, which highlights the electoral motives of legislative parties and the strategic interaction between parties. We test this theory using the entire range of House and Senate party behavior from 1789 to 2000 and find that the strategic behavior of parties complements members' preferences as an explanation for variation in party influence. Specifically, the strongest predictors of one party's voting unity are the unity of the opposing party and the difference between the parties in the preceding year. Moreover, we find strong links between party behavior in Congress and electoral outcomes: an increase in partisan influence on legislative voting has adverse electoral costs, while winning contested votes has electoral benefits.