Research note: career stage and job satisfaction among southern correctional officers

The career stage theory postulates that employees go through different career stages, and each career stage has different effects on various outcomes, such as job satisfaction. There has been empirical support for the career stage theory from other disciplines, but there has been limited research relating to this theory to corrections. To expand the literature, the current study examined whether different career stages were significant predictors of job satisfactions, while including the personal characteristics and the workplace place variables among Texas correctional officers. The results supported the career state theory: job satisfaction was highest during the entry stage (0–2 years), but was lowest during the second career stage (2–5 years). In career stages three (5–15 years) and four (16+ years), job satisfaction rose. Possible interventions that correctional administrators can undertake to encourage job satisfaction from their staff during the second career stage are discussed.     

Today was not a good day: offender accounts of the incidents that led to their admission to drug court

One method that has been touted to help end mass incarceration is using intermediate sanctions. While intermediate sanctions often present as attractive options, there is evidence that as practiced, these sanctions often result in net widening. One of the most common forms of intermediate sanctions are drug courts, which are often viewed as progressive alternatives to locking up people with substance abuse problems. However, along with the dangers of net widening, scholars have shown that many people admitted to drug courts do not seem to have substance abuse problems and could benefit from lesser criminal justice interventions. In the current study, we analyzed intake data from a drug court to determine: (1) what charge(s) drug participants had and (2) how they became involved with the criminal justice system. Among important findings were that a large number of drug court participants were arrested for the possession of one drug only (often marijuana) and that more than half of participants came to the attention of the criminal justice system through a traffic stop rather than through repeated encounters with the criminal justice system.     

The Political Economy of Improving Health Care for the Poor in Rural Africa: Institutional Solutions to the Principal–Agent Problem

Both governments and private for-profit markets have been disappointing in meeting the needs of the African poor for health care. NGO services provide a much more attractive alternative for this clientele, despite the fees they charge. They do so because they represent an institutional solution to the ‘imperfect information’ problem in health care. Through simulations based on data from Cameroon, we demonstrate that if fee-charging NGOs replace the highly subsidised but poorly managed facilities operated by African governments the poor would be better off. Those NGOs that are decentralised in their financial and personnel management are most effective. The politics of making the recommended changes are assessed.     

British corporatism

Politics in Industrial Society. By Keith Middlemas. London: Andre Deutsch, 1979. Pp.512. £14.95 (case). £5.95 (paper).

The Politics of the Corporate Economy. By Trevor Smith. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979. £17.50.

Governing Under Pressure: The Policy Process in a Post‐Parliamentary Democracy. By J.J. Richardson and Grant Jordan. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979. £16.50 (case). £5.90 (paper).     

Citizens, Representatives, and the Myth of the Decision-Making Divide

In this study, I use a computerized experiment to test whether elected officials differ from everyday citizens in how they use information to make political choices. Ninety state and local level elected officials took part in the study, as did 179 adults from the general population. I tracked participants’ information use as they attempted to solve two hypothetical public policy problems. The data show that while elected officials differ from everyday citizens in their demographics and in the consistency of their political views, these groups did not differ systematically in their depth of information search, their proclivity to compare choice alternatives, or their depth of information processing. These findings held across two different public policy scenarios, controlling for differences in political knowledge, education, and elective experience. In addition to opening a new methodological frontier for the study of political elites, these results accelerate an ongoing debate between Burkeian paternalists and advocates of a more populist democracy.