Cost-sharing — A necessary component for successful technology transfer

The general objective of this paper is to propose the establishment of a federal cost-sharing policy for reducing risk in transferring technology from the R&D stage to commercialization. Minimization of this risk barrier is expected to encourage diverse groups to participate in technology transfer. Section II focuses on specific barriers that impede technology transfer efforts and it presents policy options to minimize identified barriers. Section III introduces objectives of cost-sharing experiments from which cost-sharing policies can be formulated. In addition, we also identify specific cost-sharing participation criteria and success variables for the policy.     

The Affect and Effect of Images of War on Individual Opinion and Emotions

We explore the conditions under which individuals are attentive to positive and negative battlefield information when forming beliefs about a conflict’s success or failure. We use three experiments to explore the impact of visual and textual battlefield cues on individuals’ emotional states and attitudes toward the war in Afghanistan. We find that both visual and textual information convey information about failure that influences public attitudes and emotions toward war. In keeping with rational expectations theory, but contrary to widespread beliefs within the journalistic and policymaking communities, textual cues and images of battlefield failure have similar effects on emotions and attitudes. The consistency of multiple war cues, however, greatly affects peoples’ reactions. Simply put, in war the content of information matters, not its delivery style.     

Interpersonal violence by authoritarian rulers: Saddam Hussein and Joseph Stalin compared

Why do some authoritarian rulers, such as Saddam Hussein, kill or torture other people personally, whereas others, like Joseph Stalin, delegate such violence to subordinates? Such politically motivated interpersonal violence committed by authoritarian leaders has never before been theorized. Through a comparison of Hussein and Stalin, we explain why some dictators engage in this behavior and others do not. We propose a model based on three components: the individual's prior habituation or non-habituation to violence; regime characteristics that ‘select for’ a personally violent or non-violent ruler; and, once a ruler takes power, the interaction of the first two variables. We also suggest that most communist regimes featured organizational characteristics that discouraged such violence by the leader.     

Franz Böhm as a pioneering champion of an economic theory of legislative science

The transaction costs concept is operationalized and expanded in order to demonstrate that Franz Böhm can be considered a forerunner of the economic analysis of law. Within economic systems transaction costs are more than mere friction. They are social catalysts inasmuch as low transaction costs foster desirable processes and high ones inhibit undesirable processes. According to Böhm, economically relevant institutions must be organized in such a way as to ensure that the transaction-cost structure is compatible with the economic functions of social processes. This should be done by cooperation between lawyers and political economists.