Examining the prevalence and correlates of a ‘senior citizen discount’ in US federal courts

Few studies focus on age as a factor influencing judicial decision-making, in spite of the widespread use of age as a control variable. Although the limited research to have done so is inconsistent, most scholars agree that age may be race- and/or gender-graded in a manner that produces more severe sentences for certain race–gender–age combinations, especially for young males who are Black or Latino. Less consensus exists with regard to whether older defendants are granted more leniency in the sentencing process and, if so, if the effects of older age are also race- and/or gender-graded. The present study examines this question by examining data from the United States Sentencing Commission. The data presented reveal three noteworthy findings. First, a ‘senior citizen discount’ exists insofar as judges afford more leniency in sentencing to older offenders than their younger counterparts. Second, compared to older males, older females were treated with greater leniency by judges. Finally, whereas Latinos 60 and over were treated with greater severity at the stage of incarceration compared to similarly situated Whites, Blacks received shorter sentence lengths on average. These results are analyzed within the framework of the focal concerns perspective.     

Too big to fail,too powerful to jail? On the absence of criminal prosecutions after the 2008 financial meltdown

Various explanations have been offered regarding the causes of the current global economic crisis that was spawned by the collapse of mortgage-based securities in the U.S. that were sold world-wide and that contained "toxic assets" comprised of subprime loans. There is ample evidence that such loans were originated through fraud. Firms recorded huge profits, and executives were awarded large bonuses even though some had led their companies into bankruptcy and plunged both the U.S. and global economies into the greatest recession since the Great Depression. This paper assesses the reasons why there have been no major prosecutions to date, and compares the U.S. government's response to that in the savings and loan crisis. It analyzes the influence of large financial institutions on lawmaking, regulation, and the allocation of enforcement resources, the continued general lack of understanding of financial fraud including control fraud, and problems related to the higher status and power of potential defendants.     

Power,REDD+ and reforming forest governance in Indonesia

Abstract

This paper analyses the various power relations that shape forest policy and governance reform in Indonesia. It applies Foucault’s theories on power to several key initiatives introduced as part of REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation). By analysing both the operation and the effects of power relations the paper accounts for how competing actors influence major policy change, and the impact different policies have on governing multiple forest users. Sovereign and disciplinary power underpins government attempts to implement new regulatory, planning and enforcement functions across the forest estate. Policy instruments such as the concession moratorium create securitised territorial zones that enable sustainable forest practices to operate. By contrast, forest management units operate through inclusive strategies that discipline forest users into responsible managers, whilst enforcement excludes those who contravene the law. Productive power and resistance explain efforts by government and non-government actors to progress or limit REDD+. Productive power operates through the multiple activities that generate new knowledge on incentivising carbon, and by engaging new subjects in carbon projects. Community resistance draws on discourses and localised subjectivities focussed on forest dependency and rights, whereas industry networks have been adept at positioning REDD+ as a threat to national development.     

Timing is everything: a quantitative study of presidentialist regime dynamics in Eurasia, 1992–2016

Why do some countries with presidentialist constitutions feature more political closure than others at a given time? A quantitative study of post-Soviet countries since independence finds that much of the observed variation in political closure reflects timing, or the particular point at which a country happens to be within a regime cycle, rather than structural or other factors usually cited to explain regime change. Specifically, how much time a president has had to coordinate rivalrous networks around his or her authority is at least as strong a predictor of the level of regime closure as are economic development, economic growth, resource rents, proximity to Europe, and key cultural factors, even when controlling for the level of closure in the preceding year. This pattern is not found among countries with divided-executive constitutions, indicating it is related to the constitution rather than a general phenomenon.     

Reflections on Leadership: Jean‐Jacques Dordain of the European Space Agency

In 2015, Jean‐Jacques Dordain retired as director general of the European Space Agency (ESA). This is Europe's NASA and includes a host of sovereign nations that differ in language, culture, economics, and politics. As ESA’s director general, Dordain pulled together a disparate and often quarreling group of countries and got them moving in the same direction. Billions of dollars were involved in a sequence of large‐scale, complex spaceflights. Successes far surpassed failures. Dordain stated that if there is one area of administration about which ESA could teach the world, it is “that of international cooperation. Very simple—it's because ESA is an institutional cooperation venture.” In this Administrative Profile, Dordain comments on the issues he faced in guiding European cooperation as well as relations with the United States and other countries.     

Explaining the Crisis of the European Migration and Asylum Regime

Since 2013, the European migration and asylum regime has entered a phase of crisis, which reveals the deep interdependencies between its different components (including intra-EU mobility) and the unbalanced nature of its normative foundations. This original structural fragility had not fundamentally compromised the overall functioning of the regime until two major exogenous factors (the economic crisis, with its asymmetrical impact on the eurozone, and the wave of political instability and conflicts on the southern shore of the Mediterranean) brought its intrinsic limits to the point of rupture. The ongoing, highly contentious process of reform of the European migration and asylum regime is an unprecedented and crucially important test of the capacity of one the European Union’s key sectors to evolve under pressure and to adapt to a rapidly and deeply changing geopolitical, economic and demographic environment.     

Presidential address— Seeing through the fog

All public policies have two things in common. They deal with the future and, as a result, they are based on forecasts or projections. The forecasts or projections may be implicit or based on naive extrapolation or ad hoc assumptions. They may be explicit and based on elaborate extrapolations or on behavioral models. In either case, unfortunately, they are notoriously unreliable. In fact, they almost always are wrong—sometimes just a bit wrong, but often massively wrong. Nonetheless, forecasts are what distinguishes reasoned planning from blind action. Without forecasts, we would be totally at sea. That we have to use forecasts or projections, that we know they will be wrong, and that they usually are wrong raise some difficult questions for policy analysis and policymaking. Regrettably, in my view, they receive too little attention.2 My purpose today is to urge that they receive more. My comments are intended to make four points. First, it is important for policymakers to appreciate how errorprone forecasts and projections actually are. Second, it is important not to permit the availability of projections or forecasts to obscure fundamental policy questions that are important in any plausible scenario. Third, uncertainty means that, where possible, it is prudent to design policies with builtin flexibility that respond automatically to diverse possible outcomes. Fourth, where builtin flexibility is impossible, complete analyses should take into account the consequences if forecasts prove wrong, and weigh those consequences against the results of postponing action until information improves or against other policies under the plausible range of possible outcomes. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Party Government and the "Cohesive Power of Public Plunder"

We argue that party government in the U.S. House of Representatives rests on two pillars: the pursuit of policy goals and the disbursement of particularistic benefits. Existing theories of party government argue that the majority party in the House is often successful in biasing policy outcomes in its favor. In the process, it creates "policy losers" among its own members who nevertheless support their party on procedural votes. We posit that the majority party creates an incentive for even the policy losers to support a procedural coalition through judicious distribution of particularistic benefits that compensates policy losers at a rate commensurate with the policy losses that they suffer. We evaluate our theory empirically using the concept of "roll rates" in conjunction with federal domestic outlays data for the period 1983–96. We find that, within the majority party, policy losers are favored in the distribution of "pork barrel" spending throughout this period.