The paradox of Turkish–Iranian relations in the Syrian Crisis

Abstract

Iran and Turkey have competed for regional power projection in Syria and sought through cooperation to find a peaceful end to the conflict in the Astana talks, while also at the same time confronting each other in Idlib province via proxies. This simultaneity of competition, cooperation and confrontation in the Syrian Crisis presents a picture of a relationship that is riddled with contradictions and is in effect a paradox. The question that must be asked is, how can we understand this puzzle of competition, cooperation and confrontation in Turkish–Iranian relations in the Syrian Crisis? International historical sociology (IHS) research brings in discussions on the longue durée, narratives, domestic constraints and, most important, the international which can help decipher this intellectual puzzle. Moreover, the ‘relationality’ of each country’s policies in Syria combined with IHS can help unlock the puzzle of the Turkish–Iranian relationship in the Syrian Crisis and provide insight into the debate surrounding the outbreak of war.     

Quality Control and Contracting Out of Legal Aid

This article reports on an evaluation of a pilot project in the tendering out of legal aid defence services for criminal matters in the Queensland District Court. Comparisons were made on quality and cost between the assignment of matters through competitive contracting and conventional assignment to private practitioners through a panel and scale fee system. Results show no significant differences in case outcomes and client perceptions of quality. In the interests of further cost reductions, any extension of tendering would need to focus on relatively simple, high-volume areas of prescribed crime, where there is less risk that competitive pricing will reduce the quality of service delivery. In addition, the evaluation indicated that greater savings might in future be obtained by enhanced utilisation of in-house (salaried) legal aid practitioners.     

State Sovereignty and Private Military and Security Companies in Australia

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) as active participants within global security environments has increased in the last two decades exponentially. States have progressively incorporated PMSCs in their security functions, both domestically and internationally. Since the conflict in Iraq in the early 2000s, there have been numerous plausible reports of PMSCs violating international humanitarian law. Despite this, only a few have ever been prosecuted, suggesting a fundamental challenge to understandings regarding state control and monopoly over violence. Utilising a historical case study of an Australian PMSC in Operation Iraqi Freedom, this article argues that PMSCs undermine Australian sovereign legitimacy. It demonstrates how Australian oversight and accountability regarding its use of PMSCs is significantly fractured and current regulatory mechanisms concerning PMSCs are deficient. Thus, the Australian government's ability to provide control over the actions of PMSCs is diminished, affecting its sovereign legitimacy and ability to monopolise violence. The article overall conveys the dubious position states come into when the use-of-force is wielded by actors for distinct material incentives.