Technical progress in bureaucracies

In this paper we raise the question whether in bureaucracies incentives are existing to implement technical progress into public goods production as it may be observed in the private sector. Therefore the well-known models of the theory of bureaucracy will be enhanced by technical progress modelled as process innovations. Depending on bureaucrats' preferences two results can be obtained: (a) If bureaucrats maximize their budget or if output or the classical production factors enter their utility function, R&D will be used efficiently due to cost reductions increasing the bureaucrats' budget or utility; (b) if bureaucrats prefer R&D as an end itself, they will use this factor like other factors by more than the efficient amount. In both cases an allocative inefficient output of the public good is produced. As a consequence society cannot benefit from gains by technical progress since net social welfare is appropriated totally by bureaucrats, even if it is increased by R&D-efforts.     

Women in the Zambian civil service: A case of equal opportunities?

There is a paucity of empirical microlevel studies of women in the formal sector in developing countries. This article attempts to redress this deficit and focuses on the position of women in the Zambian civil service using information from a sample of personnel records. Although women are disproportionately represented in the civil service compared with other areas of the formal economy, the current positions of males and females are significantly different. However, the results of the survey are not easily encompassed in prevailing theoretical frameworks and, rather surprisingly, it appears that it is age rather than gender that is the crucial explanatory variable. Finally, a number of possible explanations are advanced to account for our findings.     

A world view of cultural diversity

Among his books are Affirmative Action Reconsidered; Civil Rights: Rhetoric and Reality; Classical Economics Reconsidered; Compassion versus Guilt; A Conflict of Visions; Economics and Politics of Race;and Education, Assumption versus History.     

Tax Design and The Meddling Factor: Lessons From Hawaii's Liquor Tax

Tax design decisions are subject to many influences, including economic and political realities. Those who make tax policy at the state level are under constant pressure to modify taxes and tax structures at the margin. In making their decisions, policy makers must assess and weigh the often conflicting advice that results from varying outlooks and interests among, as well as within, the groups providing such input.
Using Hawaii's liquor tax as a case study, this paper illustrates how seemingly innocuous policy meddling can turn a good tax into a bad one. The events that led the Hawaii Legislature to decide to substitute a flawed gallonage levy for a successful ad valorem tax are reviewed. The relative merits of ad valorem and per-unit liquor taxes are discussed. Implications of adoption of the gallonage tax are presented. Finally, the article discusses the reasons why meddling may be attractive to both taxpayers and those who levy the tax, and it concludes that tax design criteria should include disincentives to meddle as a reasonable principle of taxation.     

Re-slicing the Big Apple: New Immigrants and African-Americans in the New York Economy

The continuing convergence of immigrants on New York City is a puzzle. On the one hand, the decline of the city's manufacturing sector and the growth of advanced services appear to provide little demand for immigrant labor; on the other hand, the deep penetration of immigrants into the city's economy has been paralleled by a deteriorating employment situation among native blacks. This article, seeks to unravel this puzzk in the light of two conflicting perspectives, the restructuring and the replacement labor hypotheses. The paper assesses each perspective using data from the 1970 and 1980 Censuses of Population and merged sampks of the June 1986 and 1988 Current Population Surveys.     

The effects of cashing-out food stomps on household food use and the cost of issuing benefits

The recent report produced by Vice President Gore's committee on government efficiency highlights the importance of streamlining government operations. But often there are trade-offs between administrative streamlining and accomplishing substantive program objectives. This article examines these tradeoffs in the context of the Food Stamp Program, an important component of the United States' safety net for providing low-income assistance. We estimate impacts on both administrative costs and substantive outcomes (participant food expenditures) resulting from issuing program benefits in the form of checks rather than the usual food coupons. The findings, which are based on experimental tests of the cashout approach in parts of Alabama and California, suggest that significant cost savings can be attained through cashout but that these savings may be achieved at the cost of weakening the program's ability to achieve its substantive objective of encouraging food use.