Economic and Security Interests in Southeast Asia

Despite worries that ASEAN is becoming weak, the organization remains as strong as it ever was, given the parameters of its design. Its member countries still tightly embrace the organization's principles, the “ASEAN way.” But simple adherence to those principles can be problematic. ASEAN countries, whose national economic and political interests collide, often appeal to the same principles to back their positions. That tends to pull ASEAN in different directions. Great power policies, particularly those of China and the United States, now exacerbate the situation. At the same time, ASEAN's reliance on multilateral consensus has made it difficult to reconcile real differences among its member countries or develop unified regional responses. That can be seen in issues from the Xayaburi dam on the Mekong River to the South China Sea. The ease with which ASEAN's principles can come into conflict and its consensus-driven decision- making can become deadlocked clearly marks the limits of the “ASEAN way.”     

The future Germany and the future of NATO

The events of 1989 have raised questions about NATO's future and purpose. Two different views are held by Germany and the USA. The Germans seek the political and economic unification of the EC, the construction of a European pillar within a demilitarised NATO, and a pan‐European collective security system. In contrast, the Americans seek to preserve NATO as a military alliance responsible for western European security under American leadership and to equip NATO with competences extending beyond the NA TO area. Whilst insisting on greater western European burden sharing and security coordination, the Americans see the roles of the CSCE and the WEU as complementary to NATO's.     

America and the Peace Talks

Abstract

During the ‘cleaning house’ period of a new administration, we are usually barraged with predictions of how all the changes will affect policy. New appointees and their past records are carefully scrutinized by the prognosticators. Such is the case with the newly chosen implementers of American Vietnam strategy. Henry Cabot Lodge is noted for his unbending anti-Communism. Henry Kissinger comes through as the hard-nosed intellectual with new, realistic solutions for the Vietnam dilemma. Ellsworth Bunker is the behind-the-scenes diplomat deferring punctiliously to Saigon's grievances. And yet what is most striking after two months of transition and new faces added to or replacing the old, is that the political climate in Washington and Paris and the traditionally defined objectives of American policy in Asia are basically unchanged. Looking at the resumption of the Peace Talks in Paris, it is already clear that basic American assumptions — and not personalities — will determine the American position in the months ahead.     

Al Shabaab's Foreign Threat to Somalia

This article focuses on the threat to Somalia by al Shabaab (The Youth), an extremist organization that controls most of southern and central Somalia. It learned its strategy and tactics from al Qaeda and the Taliban and relies heavily on a relatively small number of foreign fighters, most of whom are Somalis with foreign passports from the large Somali diaspora. The non-Somali contingent probably numbers only about 200 to 300, although it brings battlefield experience from Afghanistan and Iraq and provides al Shabaab with expertise in bomb making, remote-controlled explosions, suicide bombing and assassinations. Some of the foreigners occupy key positions in al Shabaab. The connection between al Shabaab and al Qaeda is growing stronger but has not yet reached the level of operational control by al Qaeda. Al Shabaab's draconian tactics, which are imported from outside and are anathema to most Somalis, and its foreign component may be its undoing.     

The Narrative History of the Chocolate Wars: A Short and Tasty Bargaining Game

ABSTRACT

This single lesson classroom game is designed to test student knowledge of Realist and Liberal concepts through an imbalanced resource bargaining mechanic. The game is designed for approximately 20 students divided into state teams of three to four students each and uses chocolate to represent the state teams’ economic capacity, military capability, and human security. Each state team had competing goals, over which they must cooperate or conflict for additional pieces. This game also uses an abstract design to maximize active learning through a short course of play while also making the game useful for testing concepts at any point in an International Relations course. In addition to offering a complete yet easily modifiable game for classroom use, this article also describes the game’s pedagogical contribution to the discipline, game design notes, and techniques for preventing students from stuffing their faces with game pieces.