Why Right‐Leaning Populism has Grown in the Most Advanced Liberal Democracies of Europe

Immigration and new class divisions, combined with a growing anti‐elitism and political correctness, are often used as explanations for the strong gains for right‐leaning populist parties in national elections across Europe in recent years. But contrary to what we might assume, such parties have been very successful in the most developed and comprehensive welfare states, in nations—such as the Nordic countries—with the best scores on economic equality and social inclusion and long established political and judicial institutions enjoying a high degree of popular legitimacy. As argued in this article, this seems to happen because a duopoly of the centre‐left and centre‐right political establishment has kept issues such as immigration and new class divisions off the public agenda and hence paved the way for right‐leaning ‘disruptor’ populist parties with an anti‐immigration agenda in times of increasing immigration.     

The American Revolution and Christine Desan's New History of Money

This essay argues that Christine Desan's Making Money: Coin, Currency and the Coming of Capitalism intervenes decisively in debates over the origin of money, while making a fundamental contribution to the legal history of money, the philosophy of money, and the history of capitalism. Desan shows money to be a mode of governance, created by rulers to extend their power, and maintained and managed by their successors. She argues that British politicians reinvented money at the end of the seventeenth century, creating the essential institutional basis for contemporary capitalism. The essay builds on Desan's analysis, showing how the tools she develops to understand the origins and development of British money can help us explain the expansion of capitalism, and the transition to capitalism associated with the American Revolution.     

Closing the Window of Vulnerability: Nuclear Proliferation and Conventional Retaliation

Living with a nuclear-armed enemy is unattractive, but, strangely, states seldom use their military power to prevent the enemy’s entry into the nuclear club. It is puzzling why preventive strikes against nuclear programs have been quite rare. I address this puzzle by considering the role of conventional retaliation, a subfield of deterrence that so far has received scant attention in the literature. I theorize the concept of conventional retaliation and test its explanatory power. First, I explore all historical cases where states struck another state’s nuclear installations and find none occurring when the proliferator threatened conventional retaliation. Second, I explore two cases where a strike was most likely, but the would-be attacker balked and find smoking-gun evidence that the threat of conventional retaliation restrained the would-be attacker. This evidence supports my claim that the threat of conventional retaliation is sufficient to deter a preventive strike against emerging nuclear states.