Economic and Security Interests in Southeast Asia

Despite worries that ASEAN is becoming weak, the organization remains as strong as it ever was, given the parameters of its design. Its member countries still tightly embrace the organization's principles, the “ASEAN way.” But simple adherence to those principles can be problematic. ASEAN countries, whose national economic and political interests collide, often appeal to the same principles to back their positions. That tends to pull ASEAN in different directions. Great power policies, particularly those of China and the United States, now exacerbate the situation. At the same time, ASEAN's reliance on multilateral consensus has made it difficult to reconcile real differences among its member countries or develop unified regional responses. That can be seen in issues from the Xayaburi dam on the Mekong River to the South China Sea. The ease with which ASEAN's principles can come into conflict and its consensus-driven decision- making can become deadlocked clearly marks the limits of the “ASEAN way.”     

Al Shabaab's Foreign Threat to Somalia

This article focuses on the threat to Somalia by al Shabaab (The Youth), an extremist organization that controls most of southern and central Somalia. It learned its strategy and tactics from al Qaeda and the Taliban and relies heavily on a relatively small number of foreign fighters, most of whom are Somalis with foreign passports from the large Somali diaspora. The non-Somali contingent probably numbers only about 200 to 300, although it brings battlefield experience from Afghanistan and Iraq and provides al Shabaab with expertise in bomb making, remote-controlled explosions, suicide bombing and assassinations. Some of the foreigners occupy key positions in al Shabaab. The connection between al Shabaab and al Qaeda is growing stronger but has not yet reached the level of operational control by al Qaeda. Al Shabaab's draconian tactics, which are imported from outside and are anathema to most Somalis, and its foreign component may be its undoing.     

Vietnam's Better War

When General Creighton Abrams took command of U.S. forces in Vietnam a better war resulted from his superior understanding of the war and more effective conduct of it, including improvement of South Vietnam's armed forces and emphasis on pacification. As American forces were progressively withdrawn, the South Vietnamese took on more and more of the load, winning the counterinsurgency war and fighting valiantly and effectively against the enemy's conventional invasion until the United States Congress drastically reduced materiel and financial assistance at the same time communist forces received massively increased support from their patrons. Thus, inevitably, South Vietnam succumbed.     

Learning from Contemporary Conflicts to Prepare for Future War

Recent and ongoing wartime experience has discredited much of the thinking that underpinned the “Defense Transformation” effort in the 1990s. If we are to be prepared for future conflict, it is vital that we learn from experience and adjust our thinking about war. It is time to develop idealized visions of future war that are consistent with what post-9/11 conflicts have revealed as the enduring uncertainty and complexity of war. These concepts should be “fighting-centric” rather than “knowledge-centric.” They should also be based on real and emerging threats, informed by recent combat experience, and connected to scenarios that direct military force toward the achievement of policy goals and objectives. We must then design and build balanced forces that are capable of conducting operations consistent with the concepts we develop.     

Defense Management Challenges for the Next American President

The next American president will face a daunting list of national security problems, including a serious defense budget crunch. The budget crisis will be deepened by the global financial crisis, a tapering of supplemental funding associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the steady growth of military healthcare and other personnel costs. After six years of rapid defense budget increases, the Pentagon has lost the practice of matching strategy and resources. The next president will need to manage risk among investments in irregular warfare, counterterrorism, balancing new super powers, countering weapons of mass destruction, and traditional warfare. He will also need to begin to build non-military “soft power” capabilities outside of the Pentagon.     

COIN Machine: The British Military in Afghanistan

This article assesses the British military effort in Afghanistan looking at three key elements in the campaign: strategy, military operations, and the inter-agency “Comprehensive Approach.” We start by recognising the scale of the challenge that has faced the British: of all the provinces in Afghanistan, Helmand is the toughest to stabilize and secure. We then examine the evolution of all three elements above and find significant improvements in each: a flawed strategy has been corrected; the military have received more resources and become significantly better at COIN; and there is significant progress in the development of the inter-agency approach. In short, what the Americans will find in Helmand is a British COIN machine; a little creaky perhaps, but one that is fit for purpose and getting the job done. We briefly conclude on the prospects and the key to success: namely the development of a more coherent international strategy that accommodates the challenges posed by both Afghanistan and Pakistan.