(MIS)Representing risk: Headline accounts of HIV-related assaults

The news media construct order by defining which events are sig-nificant and interpreting these events for the public. Sometimes, though, the media distort reality. The current study focuses on the media exaggeration of the threat posed by nonsexual HIV-related assaults. Although such assaults are widely perceived as serious threats, the likelihood of HIV being transmitted through a biting, spitting, or needlestick incident is quite small. Based on news accounts culled from 17 of the largest newspapers in the United States, the findings illustrate how headlines rely upon sensational language, negative stereotyping of offenders, and the cloak of “neutral and objective” court decisions to articulate a sense of order and morality while simultaneously exaggerating the threat people with HIV pose to the general public.     

Show Them Your Teeth First!

This paper investigates the choice of an interestgroup between lobbying (``words'') and pressure(``actions'') in order to influence a policymaker. Both lobbying and pressure are modeled asstrategic means of transmitting information that isrelevant to the policymaker. However, only pressure isdirectly costly to the policymaker. The interactionbetween the interest group and the policymaker isframed as a repeated signaling game. In equilibriumpressure – in contrast to lobbying – only occurswhen the interest group's reputation is sufficientlylow, and always improves its reputation. It is shownthat (repeated) lobbying cannot completely substitutefor pressure, and that the interest group may beforced to sustain its reputation through lobbying. Weconclude that pressure is typically used to build upa reputation, lobbying to maintain a reputation.     

Authority and Authorisation

The core of Kelsen's strong views onauthority emerging from his concept of law is this:Authority of law, authority in law andauthority about law are one and the same thing.The conceptual problems suggested by these threedifferent prepositions must and can be solved in onefell swoop. Kelsen's core view will first be probed bygiving an account of what is a promising approachoffered in a fairly early text, Das Problem derSouveränität, namely, what it means to`set' or `posit' the law. Inevitably, this leadsto an interpretation of the Grundnorm, one thatintends to accommodate as many Kelsenian emphases aspossible. The Grundnorm will be presented as ashield against hypostatising authority. From there,some characteristics will be inferred of the type ofauthority that arises from Kelsen's account of legalknowledge, which will be called, somewhat polemically,authority without an author.     

Does the Wage Tax System Cause Budget Deficits A Macro-Economic Experiment

In this paper we investigate experimentallythe economic functioning of a wage taxsystem for financing unemployment benefits in aninternational economy, in particular inreaction to budget deficits and taxadjustment. Our results support the hypothesisthat due to out-of-equilibrium priceuncertainty producers are reluctant toemploy inputs. We also observe a downward pressureon wages exacerbated by an over-supply of labor by consumers. Theseobservations can explain the budgetdeficits found. Furthermore, we find that taxadjustments in order to facilitate abalancing of the budget has strong adverse effects onunemployment and real GDP.     

Fiscal Adjustments and Their Effects During the Transition to the EMU

The transition phase to EMU hasbeen accompanied by considerable monetaryand fiscal consolidation efforts in the EU.This paper analyses this consolidationprocess and its effects on economicactivity in the EU. It is tested to what extent fiscal retrenchment efforts havedepressed or stimulated private spending. Inthe case of the latter non-Keynesian effectsdominate the traditional Keynesianexpenditure effects of government spending,taxation and transfer payments.     

The regulatory state in developing countries: Redistribution and regulatory failure in Brazil

Following the traditional doctrine of the “regulatory state”, regulatory agencies should be given very focused mandates and stay away from the politicized realm of distributive policies and decisions. An opposing perspective would state that if regulatory agencies can contribute to economic redistribution, positive results such as network expansion, economies of scale, and fiscal efficiency will ultimately lead to lower levels of regulatory failure. This article tests whether, in countries of high socio-economic inequality, such as Brazil, the active incorporation of distributive considerations by regulatory agencies leads to lower levels of failure. Through the analysis of the activities of seven Brazilian network regulatory agencies, the article develops theory-driven expectations and tests these expectations using crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA). It concludes that not prioritizing redistribution is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for regulatory agencies' failure. In most types of failure, a lack of priority to redistribution leads to failure when combined with low regulatory capacity and low levels of competence.     

What Difference Does a Robe Make? Comparing Mediators with and without Prior Judicial Experience

This article reports the results of two studies. The first study, based on the responses of attorneys to questions about the reasons for the success of mediators with and without prior judicial experience, shows that the capacity of the mediator to gain the confidence of the disputants was most important for mediators with and without prior judicial experience. Although certain process skills were viewed as important to the success of both former judges and nonjudges, in general, process skills were significantly more important for nonjudges than for former judges. The capacity to provide useful case evaluations, on the other hand, was significantly more important for former judges than for nonjudges. The second study, based upon attorney responses to questions about unsatisfactory mediators, reinforced the conclusions of the first study regarding the importance of confidence-building attributes. For both judges and nonjudges, the mediator's inability to gain the confidence of the parties was a major reason for his or her lack of success.