Academic faculty governance and recruitment decisions

We analyze the implications of the governance structure in academic faculties for their recruitment decisions when competing for new researchers. The value to individual members through social interaction within the faculty depends on the average status of their fellow members. In recruitment decisions, incumbent members trade off the effect of entry on average faculty status against alternative uses of the recruitment budget if no entry takes place. We show that the best candidates join the best faculties but that they receive lower wages than some lesser ranking candidates. We also study the allocation of surplus created by the entry of a new faculty member and show that faculties with symmetric status distributions maximize their joint surplus under majority voting.     

Preferences for International Redistribution: The Divide over the Eurozone Bailouts

Why do voters agree to bear the costs of bailing out other countries? Despite the prominence of public opinion in the ongoing debate over the eurozone bailouts, voters' preferences on the topic are poorly understood. We conduct the first systematic analysis of this issue using observational and experimental survey data from Germany, the country shouldering the largest share of the EU's financial rescue fund. Testing a range of theoretical explanations, we find that individuals' own economic standing has limited explanatory power in accounting for their position on the bailouts. In contrast, social dispositions such as altruism and cosmopolitanism robustly correlate with support for the bailouts. The results indicate that the divide in public opinion over the bailouts does not reflect distributive lines separating domestic winners and losers. Instead, the bailout debate is better understood as a foreign policy issue that pits economic nationalist sentiments versus greater cosmopolitan affinity and other‐regarding concerns.     

Interests,Instruments and Institutional Preferences in the EU Comitology System: The 2006 Comitology Reform

This paper seeks to reveal the institutional interests of the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the Commission in the comitology system. This is done by an investigation of the 2006 comitology reform, which introduced the regulatory procedure with scrutiny. This reform was the result of developments in four areas: the Lamfalussy reform in the area of financial regulation; the controversial use of comitology in the area of GMOs, food safety and the environment; the failed Constitutional Treaty; and the amending of the 1999 comitology decision. The analysis shows that the reform was the result of a two‐dimensional constitutional struggle. The first dimension concerns the relative supervisory position of the two legislative actors, the Council and the European Parliament. The second dimension concerns the relationship between the legislative and the executive branch of the EU system. In theoretical terms, the analysis demonstrates an example of T.M. Moe's ‘politics of structural choice’. The paper ends by drawing lessons for the negotiations on the new comitology system following the Lisbon Treaty.     

Accountability or “Good Decisions”? The Competing Goals of Civil Society Participation in International Governance

Civil society participation in international and European governance is often promoted as a remedy to its much-lamented democratic deficit. We argue in this paper that this claim needs refinement because civil society participation may serve two quite different purposes: it may either enhance the democratic accountability of intergovernmental organisations and regimes, or the epistemic quality of rules and decisions made within them. In comparing the European Union and World Trade Organization (WTO) in the field of biotechnology regulation we find that many participatory procedures officially are geared towards the epistemic quality of regulatory decisions. In practice, however, these procedures provide little space for epistemic deliberation. Nevertheless, they often lead to enhanced transparency and hence improve the accountability of governance. We also find evidence confirming findings from the literature that the different roles assigned to civil society organisations as “watchdogs” and “deliberators” are at times difficult to reconcile. Our conclusion is that we need to acknowledge potential trade-offs between the two democratising functions of civil society participation and should be careful not to exaggerate our demands on civil society organisations.     

MPs and the Internet – An Empirically Based Typology

In recent years, both an increase in and a process of differentiation of ‘new’, digital media devices, including rising numbers of citizens turning to them, have stimulated recurring speculation about a readjustment of the communicative relationship between political representatives and the people. The debate about ‘electronic democracy’ has so far focused predominantly on technical potentials on the one hand and citizens' exposure to interactive political communication channels on the other. By contrast, the ‘supply side’, that is, the internet activities of political actors and especially their motives, has been investigated relatively rarely. Against this backdrop, two representative surveys were conducted among German and Austrian members of parliament that investigated their attitudes towards the internet. The results demonstrate similarities and differences in internet-related competences and assessments which are explained by micro- and meso-level factors. Foremost, an age-related ‘digital divide’ was found crossing the parliamentarian rows in both countries.