The “process” of patenting: Why should we care about a potential U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bilski v. Doll?

In Bilski v. Doll, the U.S. Supreme Court is called to define one of the categories of patent-eligible subject matter, “process” patents. In 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the category has a narrow meaning, and that to be eligible for a process patent under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the invention must involve a machine or apparatus or involve a transformation to a different state or thing, ultimately rejecting the patent application as unpatentable subject matter. The patent applicants have asked the U.S. Supreme Court to determine two issues: first, the meaning of “process” in 35 U.S.C. § 101 and whether the lower court properly relied on a “machine-or-transformation” test, and second, the test's potential conflict with 35 U.S.C. § 273, which provides protection for “method[s] of doing or conducting business.” The Court's decision could change the way that research and business are done, and patent protection for such investments. Parts 1 and 2 of this article address Bilski directly and what is and is not in dispute. Part 3 addresses the “machine-or-transformation” test, while Parts 4 and 5 address reasons not to adopt such a test.     

CHARTING A COURSE THROUGH THE HEALTH CARE POLICY MAZE

Health Policy: Development, Implementation and Evaluation in Australia. By H eather GARDNER (ed.)
The Price of Health: Australian Governments and Medical Politics 1910–1960. By J ames A G illespie
Federalism and Health Policy: The Development of Health Systems in Canada and Australia. By G wendolyn G ray
The President's Health Security Plan. By W hite H ouse D omestic C ouncil
Hospitals in Transition: The Resource Management Experiment. By T im P ackwood , J ustin K een and M artin B uxton     

Subjective Age in the Transition to Adulthood for Persons with and without Motor Disabilities

This study examined subjective age (how old one feels) and associated variables in 148 emerging adults, ages 20–30 years. Seventy-six participants had a motor disability (cerebral palsy, spina bifida) and 72 had no motor disability. Participants completed questionnaires and were interviewed. There was no significant difference in subjective age between groups. Consistent with previous research, chronological and subjective ages were significantly negatively related in participants without motor disabilities. Chronological and subjective ages were unrelated in the group with motor disabilities but higher psychosocial maturity was related to an older subjective age. Perceptions of how much parents fostered autonomy did not predict subjective age in either group. In both groups, individuals whose parents treated them as younger reported feeling younger. Number of role transitions did not predict subjective age. The results highlight the importance of exploring motor disabilities as a source of diversity in the subjective ages of young people during the transition to adulthood.