TRUMP'S CYCLE OF FAILURE

正The United States goes it alone down the protectionist road On July 6,U.S.President Donald Trump launched a series of punitive and counterproductive tariffs on $34 billion worth of Chinese goods and products.In response,China applied reciprocal tariffs on$34 billion worth of U.S.goods.These moves come on top of U.S.tariffs already imposed on Chinese steel,aluminum,washing machines and solar panels.     

TOP PRIORITY TASK

<正>Deepening supply-side structural reform is at the heart of China’s economic progress endeavors The annual gathering of the National People’s Congress(NPC)and the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference(CPPCC),commonly called the Two     

Gubernatorial Veto Powers and the Size of Legislative Coalitions

Few political institutions are as central to theories of lawmaking as the executive veto. Despite its importance, institutional continuity at the national level has precluded identification of empirical effects of the veto on legislative behavior. We address this limitation and present evidence from the states demonstrating how the veto affects the formation of legislative coalitions and, indirectly, executive influence over policymaking. We find consistent evidence that the presence and strength of gubernatorial veto powers affect the lawmaking behavior of state legislatures. Our analysis shows how institutional provisions condition executives' ability to affect policy outcomes in separation‐of‐powers systems.     

The nature, origin and impact of legally binding consequences: the case of the climate regime

The Marrakesh Accords provide a detailed compliance system for the Kyoto Protocol. An innovative feature of this system is an Enforcement Branch authorized to apply punitive measures or “consequences” in the second commitment period to Annex I Parties that have been found to be in non-compliance in the first commitment period. However, even after the latest Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), COP-11, and the first COP serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, COP/MOP-1, it is not yet clear whether these consequences will be legally binding. The purpose of this paper is three-fold. First, we examine the legal nature of the punitive consequences embedded in the Marrakesh Accords. Second, we discuss potential motives for making these consequences legally binding. We point out that one such motive is that their implementation requires cooperation by the Party that is in non-compliance. In this regard, Kyotoȁ9s compliance system differs from other international compliance systems equipped with punitive consequences, such as those of the WTO and the UN. Finally, we consider whether making the punitive consequences legally binding is likely to make a difference. The conclusion, which should be of interest to both academic researchers and the policy community, is that the legal status of the consequences is likely to have only a modest effect on compliance levels. A country that deliberately fails to abide by other legally binding commitments under the Kyoto Protocol is also likely to resist the application of punitive consequences, regardless of whether these consequences are made legally binding or not.