Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Russia: Contending Paradigms and Current Perspectives

The most outstanding trend in contemporary conflicts has been the fusion of the threats from terrorism and insurgency. Insurgent threats in many places on the globe today are mistaken as terrorist threats, and counterterrorism (CT) is deployed as the local insurgents come increasingly to resemble their transnational terrorist partners. Such an emphasis on the role of terrorism in insurgencies and the undue focus on CT risks strengthening, rather than severing, the connection between local insurgents and transnational terrorists. Russia's counterterrorist strategy inadvertently transformed the conflict from a contained, nationalist rebellion to a sprawling jihadi insurgency and perversely encouraged the group to resort even more to terrorist tactics. The Russian counterinsurgency has been unsuccessful, as the insurgents are neither demolished as a force nor are they isolated by society. Losing the hearts and minds among the Chechen people is a key reason behind why the Russian operation in Chechnya suffered failures. Too little attention was paid to winning over the “hearts and minds” of the people.     

The Impact of Earnings Disregards on the Behavior of Low‐Income Families

This paper investigates the impact of changes in earnings disregards for welfare assistance received by single mothers following welfare reform in 1996. Some states adopted much higher earnings disregards (women could work full‐time and still receive substantial welfare benefits), while other states did not. We explore the effect of these changes on women's labor supply and income using several data sources and multiple estimation strategies. Our results indicate these changes had little effect on labor supply or income. We show this is because surprisingly few women used the earnings disregards. We discuss several explanations for why this might occur.     

A re‐analysis that supports our main results: A reply to Levine et al.

Levine et al. (2018) criticized our meta‐analysis, but their conclusion was the same as ours: The cognitive approach to lie detection results in a modest improvement. We address and dismiss Levine et al.'s (2018) three criticisms. Regarding the ‘confound’, in our meta‐analysis we averaged the results of two cells on statistical grounds, which does not constitute a confound in statistical terms. Regarding ‘aberrant controls’, that depends entirely on the benchmarks selected and type of statistical test and meta‐analysis used. Regarding ‘unreliable data’, the claim that there is a positive relationship between ‘unreliable’ data and total accuracy in the cognitive lie detection conditions is not even supported by their own data (p = .16). We conclude with a request to Levine et al. to focus on our shared aim: to develop interview protocols that enable lie detection.