Comparing Models of Strategic Choice: The Role of Uncertainty and Signaling

e-mail: wand{at}stanford.edu Testing the fit of competing equilibrium solutions to extensiveform games crucially depends on assumptions about the distributionof player types. To illustrate the importance of these assumptionsfor differentiating standard statistical models of strategicchoice, I draw on a game previously analyzed by Lewis and Schultz(2003). The differences that they highlight between a pair ofperfect Bayesian equilibrium and quantal response equilibriummodels are not produced by signaling and updating dynamics asclaimed, but are instead produced by different assumptions aboutthe distribution of player types. The method of analysis developedand the issues raised are applicable to a broad range of structuralmodels of conflict and bargaining.     

The analysis of an intracerebral hematoma for drugs of abuse

Toxicological investigations were performed on an intracerebral hematoma, antemortem blood, and postmortem blood of an individual who was found unresponsive in his home. The hematoma was found to have ethanol at a concentration of 0.05% (w/v), and benzoylecgonine (a cocaine metabolite) was also confirmed at a concentration of 0.43 mg/L by specific analysis using gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS). These results enabled the pathologist to record the cause of death as intracerebral hemorrhage due to acute cocaine intoxication.