Institutionalizing Legal Consciousness: Regulation and the Embedding of Market Participants in the Securities Industry in Ghana and Fiji

How do differences in the implementation of regulation impact market behavior? I propose a theoretical framework to understand this impact as part of the process of embedding market participants through the institutionalization of legal consciousness within a field of action. I use this framework to understand the impact of the difference in the implementation of securities regulation in Ghana and Fiji. In Fiji, where the regulatory agency is more present and process‐oriented, brokers operate with a greater orientation toward formal rules. In Ghana, where the regulatory agency is distant and auditing, brokers rely on explicit enforcement of floor‐based norms. Conceiving of legal consciousness as an emergent feature of a field of social action advances the understanding of how legality is institutionalized, since the emergent structure shapes the orientations, behavior, and relations of actors within the field.     

Encouraging Tax Compliance With Positive Incentives: A Conceptual Framework and Research Directions*

Drawing on learning and social psychological research, we identify the processes by which positive incentives induce compliance with regulatory laws, using tax as a specific example. We evaluate the likely effects of various positive incentives on four different dimensions of compliance decisions: instrumental consequences, normative considerations, internalized motivation, and allegiance to authority. Linking incentives specifically to compliant behavior invokes a cost/benefit analysis, lowers intrinsic motivation and allegiance to authority, and requires authorities to monitor citizens and to distinguish between compliant and noncompliant behaviors. The alternative is to present the incentives as an attempt by the enforcement authorities to cooperate with the citizens. This method is less likely to invoke cost/benefit calculations; requires less intervention by authorities; and increases intrinsic motivation, consideration of normative issues, and allegiance to authorities. Prior research suggests that respectful treatment and praise may be more effective incentives for inducing long-lasting compliance than are materialistic incentives because people have a strong tendency to reciprocate actions they receive from authorities. Our analysis leads to proposals for program implementation and evaluation and raises some theoretical questions that need additional research.     

MEDIATION IN CHILD PROTECTION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

The child protection mediation or case conference–implemented under the new Child, Family, and Community Services Act–is a mandatory conference in British Columbia that attempts to provide a plan of care for the apprehended child or children through a combined cooperative effort of parents, social workers, their respective counsel, parties that have an interest in the child's welfare, and the mediation judge. It is also a process that undertakes to counter the adversarial effects of trial where the potential for conflict is great and seeks to achieve the spirit of building solutions through cooperation for the continued care of the child. A year later, the results look encouraging, as two thirds of cases settle and, in British Columbia, unlike any other province, the case conference is made available in every community where court is held.     

Judicial Power in Russia: Through the Prism of Administrative Justice

This article assesses the power of judges in Russia (on courts of general jurisdiction, arbitrazh courts, and military courts) in dealing with cases in which the government or one of its officials is a party. Power, that is, the resources of judges to make binding decisions, is understood as including jurisdiction, discretion, and authority to ensure compliance. The article analyzes the dramatic growth of jurisdiction and caseload in administrative justice in post-Soviet Russia to the year 2002 and examines how the courts have performed in handling the review of actions by officials (including in the military), tax cases, electoral disputes, and the legality of normative acts (both regulations and laws of lower governments), especially in the late 1990s. High rates of success for persons bringing suits against the government suggest that judges were able by and large to adjudicate fairly and rule against the state. To a considerable degree (but not always), those decisions were implemented (more often than were constitutional and commercial decisions). Interestingly, citizens who challenged the actions of officials in court had much more success than those who brought complaints to the Procuracy. Finally, the article develops an agenda for future research that would deepen understanding of the significance of administrative justice in the Russian Federation and the power of judges.     

The Greater Yellowstone policy debate: What is the policy problem?

Yellowstone National Park and the surrounding mountainous region comprise the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem (GYE), a 19 million acre area that is one of the few relatively intact ecosystems in the lower 48 states. Conservationists believe that continuation of present land management practices in the region will disrupt the ecological integrity of the GYE. Many authors have identified and described these threats, but as yet there has been no sustained effort to make sense of these threats in the context of the ongoing dynamic policy debate. We develop the foundation for such understanding by examining the implicit problem definitions that have emerged from this debate. They fall into three general categories: 1) a scientific definition, 2) an economic definition, and 3) a bureaucratic definition. This process produces an exploratory definition of the policy problem, which suggests a strategy for better understanding and policy design. We propose several intervention points at which substantive, one-the-ground improvements in the management of the GYE are possible.     

Introduction to Jesse Burkhead Symposium

Government budgeting is one of the major processes by which the use of public resources is planned and controlled. To the extent that this is done well, governmental programs are brought increasingly to the service of its citizens, enhancing their material and cultural status.
The study of government budgeting is a study in applied economics—in the allocation of scarce resources. This study must look at operations and begin with organization and procedure, the routines which have been established for decision–making in government. It should extend to an examination of the influences, governmental and nongovernmental, that come to bear on the decision-making process.
Ours is both an organized society and a society of organizations. The significance of organization is nowhere more evident than in the public sector. Here organizational arrangements bring together the learning of all social scientists. The patterns for decision-making do not provide separate compartments for economic knowledge, for political knowledge, for social knowledge. These are merged in the organizational arrangements which have been established for the conduct of governmental affairs.1     

Explaining the Role of Restrictive Rules in the Postreform House

Abstract Four competing explanations have emerged regarding restrictive rules in Congress. Informational theory claims that rules reduce information costs and facilitate committee specialization. The distributional perspective suggests that rules enforce legislative bargains and help members achieve gains‐from‐trade. Another claim is that rules increase the Rules Committee's independent influence over policy. Lastly, partisan theory asserts that rules are used to increase the majority party's influence over policy. Abstract This analysis tests these claims during the 97th, 98th, 104th, and 105th Congresses. The findings demonstrate that theoretical constructs developed in earlier analyses of special rules are not robust over time and across legislative contexts. The results refute majoritarian assertions that rules are used as informational devices. Similarly, little evidence supports the claim that Rules Committee preferences independently affect rule assignment. Instead, a partisan principal‐agent framework emerges as the most useful construct to explain procedural choice in the postreform House.