The Achaemenid Empire’s Contributions to Public Administration

The Achaemenid Empire established the world’s first complex administrative system of government in 559 B.C. There are numerous administrative accomplishments by the Achaemenids that have not successfully been duplicated in modern times, despite the Pony Express, the Suez Canal, and perfected recycling systems. Political debate, formal rewards systems, federal agencies, and integrated federal and provincial levels of government among a culturally diverse population were characteristic of the trailblazing Achaemenid Empire. Furthermore, administrative ideologies such as government’s responsibility to serve the public and provide equal rights were incorporated first by Cyrus the Great’s Human Rights Charter.     

State Proxy or Security Dilemma? Understanding Anti-Rebel Militias in Civil War

Abstract

Militias are responsible for some of the most egregious human rights abuses in civil wars. This said, they vary tremendously, and some may serve as a source of security against abusive rebel groups. What distinguishes predatory anti-rebel militias from those which are more or less popular? While previous studies focus on the relationship between militias and states, this study demands equal attention to the militia/rebel relationship. While militias in East Timor were largely predatory, formed at the behest of state forces to attack rebel supporters, militias in Aceh were more diverse, and some formed among ethnic minorities against rebel attacks. This article proposes that militias created where the state dominates are likely to be predatory, while those resisting powerful rebels are more likely to be defensive, popular organizations.     

International convention against the taking of hostages

Anthony H. Cordesman. After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993). 811 pp. $68.50.

Tore Bjoergo and Rob Witte, eds. Racist Violence in Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

Hugh Smith and Anthony Bergin, eds. Naval Power in the Pacific: Toward the Year 2000 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 186 + xiii pp. $35.00.

Max G. Manwaring, ed., Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993). 198 pp. $19.95.

Samuel M. Makinda. Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1993).     

Who Cares about the Weather?: Climate Change and U.S. National Security

Is climate change a national security threat to the United States? This question remains a subject of debate in academia and has received renewed emphasis in the policy community. Even taking a narrow definition of national security, climate change already constitutes a national security threat to the United States, both in terms of direct threats to the country as well as its broader extraterritorial interests. While some of these purported threats—abrupt climate change and sea-level rise—have been overstated by advocates, several concerns, mostly related to the effects of extreme weather events on the United States and its strategic interests overseas, are sufficient enough that they already constitute security threats. That climate change potentially poses a direct threat to the U.S. homeland and its overseas interests suggests the subject warrants serious attention.     

Experimental Evidence on the Effect of Childhood Investments on Postsecondary Attainment and Degree Completion

This paper examines the effect of early childhood investments on college enrollment and degree completion. We used the random assignment in Project STAR (the Tennessee Student/Teacher Achievement Ratio experiment) to estimate the effect of smaller classes in primary school on college entry, college choice, and degree completion. We improve on existing work in this area with unusually detailed data on college enrollment spells and the previously unexplored outcome of college degree completion. We found that assignment to a small class increases students’ probability of attending college by 2.7 percentage points, with effects more than twice as large among black students. Among students enrolled in the poorest third of schools, the effect is 7.3 percentage points. Smaller classes increased the likelihood of earning a college degree by 1.6 percentage points and shifted students toward high‐earning fields such as STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics), business, and economics. We found that test‐score effects at the time of the experiment were an excellent predictor of long‐term improvements in postsecondary outcomes.     

The economy,corruption, and the vote: Evidence from experiments in Sweden and Moldova

How does corruption affect voting behavior when economic conditions are poor? Using a novel experimental design and two original survey experiments, we offer four important conclusions. First, in a low corruption country (Sweden), voters react negatively to corruption regardless of the state of the economy. Second, in a high corruption country (Moldova), voters react negatively to corruption only when the state of the economy is also poor; when economic conditions are good, corruption is less important. Third, respondents in Sweden react more strongly to corruption stimuli than respondents in Moldova. Finally, in the low corruption country, sociotropic corruption voting (or voting based on corruption among political leaders) is relatively more important, whereas in our high corruption country, pocketbook corruption voting (or voting based on one's own personal experience with corruption, i.e., being asked to pay bribes) is equally prevalent. Our findings are consistent with multiple stable corruption equilibria, as well as with a world where voters are more responsive to corruption signals more common in their environment.     

People Power or a One‐Shot Deal? A Dynamic Model of Protest

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, a crucial question is whether popular protest is now likely to be a permanent part of Middle Eastern politics or if the protests that have taken place over the past two years are more likely to be a “one‐shot deal.” We consider this question from a theoretical perspective, focusing on the relationship between the consequences of protests in one period and the incentives to protest in the future. The model provides numerous predictions for why we might observe a phenomenon that we call the “one‐shot deal”: when protest occurs at one time but not in the future despite an intervening period of bad governance. The analysis focuses on the learning process of citizens. We suggest that citizens may not only be discovering the type or quality of their new government—as most previous models of adverse selection assume—but rather citizens may also be learning about the universe of potential governments in their country. In this way, bad performance by one government induces some pessimism about possible replacements. This modeling approach expands the formal literature on adverse selection in elections in two ways: it takes seriously the fact that removing governments can be costly, and it explores the relevance of allowing the citizen/principal to face uncertainty about the underlying distribution from which possible government/agent types are drawn.