The Short‐Term Effects of Mediation on Low‐Intensity Civil Wars

International diplomacy, to the extent it is effective, should not only prevent escalation of low‐intensity conflict, but should also facilitate de‐escalation. This article focuses on the short‐term effects of managing low‐intensity civil wars through third‐party mediation. Specifically, we compare the efficacy of third party‐mediated direct (face‐to‐face) and indirect talks in low‐intensity civil wars from 1993 to 2004 using the Managing Intrastate Low‐Intensity Conflict data set. We argue that a focus on short‐term success is valid because of the relationship among mediation, short‐term success, humanitarian aid access, and peacebuilding. We also assess the roles of mediator identity, mediation strategy (behavior focus versus incompatibility focus), peace agreements, war type, per capita gross domestic product, level of democracy, and conflict duration. Our overarching finding is that direct forms of mediation in which all parties meet face to face were the most likely to yield short‐term success in the sample of civil wars that we analyzed.     

Latin American terrorism and the Soviet connection revisited

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a number of scholars and journalists argued that the USSR was sponsoring terrorism as a means of low‐intensity conflict against the non‐communist world. This view was endorsed by the Reagan administration. This article assesses what substance there is behind such charges as they relate to Latin America. Its main argument is that sponsorship of terrorists has usually occurred as a byproduct of Soviet support of armed revolution as a tactic rather than for terrorism as such. Soviet willingness to assist armed struggle has varied over the last three decades. The article concludes that, given the current priorities of Soviet Latin American policy, Moscow's sponsorship of armed struggle, including terrorism, is decreasing and will almost certainly continue do so.     

The Calculus of Nation in the Cuban Revolution

The history of Cuba was imbued with a sense of purpose at its inception. To have discerned the need at all for a history of Cuba in the nineteenth century was itself product and portent of a momentous shift in consciousness, an occasion when narratives of the past revealed themselves as a potential source of national community. The history of Cuba began at the moment that the past became relevant to the future. Historical narrative developed as a matter of necessity, a product of a time and place, a means by which Cubans addressed the needs of their times. Purpose and point of view were inscribed into the very premise of the historical narrative, and indeed fixed the narrative genre around which the history of Cuba was structured. The historical narrative in this instance contained a premonition of nation which shared something with the new collective consciousness to which it contributed. Historical consciousness was itself a product of national formation, to which it responded and for which it was summoned: the proposition of a shared awareness of a common past with which to bring a people together and justify a nation apart.     

When Humanitarianism Matters: Liberalism and the Termination of Strategic Commitments

For all of the recent advances in the study of humanitarian norms in international relations, the prevailing sentiment remains that human rights are subordinate to other interests, especially strategic, in great power foreign policy making. This article seeks to lay the foundation to qualify this extant pessimism. It does so through a study of strategic commitments. Focusing specifically on security assistance in Latin America during the Cold War, this study assesses when and how humanitarian norms are most likely to lead democratic states to terminate these types of pledges. In so doing, it contributes to the growing literature on democratic commitments, furthers our understanding of non-governmental organization influence on international politics, and, most importantly, lays the theoretical basis for better assessing the extent to which humanitarian norms frame relationships between democracies and strategic partners.     

T2 Transfer of high technology from the united states to the soviet bloc: A public policy issue

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Soviet-bloc states are engaged in an extensive effort in the legal as well as illegal acquisition of United States high technology. This study examines the importance to the U. S. of such losses; the manner in which the Soviets acquire our high technology; benefits of such acquisitions to the Soviet Union; steps being taken by the U. S. to reduce its loss of high technology; and the author's recommended course of action to reduce high-technology transfer.

The transfer of U. S. high technology to the Soviet Union is recognized as one of our most serious national security problems. This problem is complicated, however, when considering our free enterprise system and the need to promote free trade. On the one hand high technology represents a substantial share of our current exports, while on the other, the United States has relied on technological superiority to offset the Soviet-bloc edge in military might. An equilibrium must be established to ensure protection of both economic and national defense interests of the United States.

The Soviet effort to acquire U. S. high technology is broad based, supported by the Military-Industrial Commission and State Committee for Science and Technology (in legal acquisitions), as well as the Soviet Intelligence Service (in illegal acquisitions). Such techniques as review of U. S. publications, U. S.-Soviet exchange programs, as well as extensive clandestine intelligence operations, are utilized by the Soviets in obtaining our high technology.

The Soviet acquisition of U. S. high technology has greatly benefited the USSR. This is clearly seen in U. S. Government estimates that the Soviets may have saved as much as $100 million in research and development of advanced microcircuitry. Several examples of savings to the Soviet defense industry as a result of high-technology transfer are elucidated in this work. In short, the Soviets have been able to save billions of defense dollars by utilizing proven U. S. designs with none of the risks experienced in the research and development of this technology.

Because of the paradoxical nature of this question of high-technology transfer, U. S. Congressional reaction to renewal of the Export Administration Act of 1979 has been mixed. On one side of the aisle, there has been support of looser controls on high-technology exports to promote free trade. On the other side of the aisle, tighter controls on such exports have been supported to protect critical U. S. high technology. At the same time, the U. S. Government has undertaken steps to strengthen its agreement with the COCOM nations. Another effort undertaken by the U. S. and other Western governments is the expulsion of accused Soviet spies from various Soviet diplomatic establishments (at least 67 Soviets from January to May, 1983). Additionally, the U. S. Department of State, Defense, Commerce, and Customs, as well as the American Intelligence Community, have undertaken efforts to reduce high-technology transfer to the Soviet Union. U. S. industry has attempted to increase security of high-technology; however, because of the Defense Investigative Service's workload, the quality of background investigations on individuals, working in firms handling defense contracts, has suffered.

The author recommends establishment of an ad-hoc matrix organization to integrate the resources and efforts of all of the federal agencies, as well as industry, in controlling the transfer of U. S. high technology to the Soviet Union and Soviet-bloc states. The author also includes recommendations as contained in various Congressional bills. The author's suggestions are made with a view toward creating a balance necessary to the protection of our free market system and protection of the national defense of the United States.     

Corruption and Policy Implementation in the Philippines: A Comparative Analysis of the Teacher Training and Textbook Delivery Programmes

Corruption is a perennial obstacle to the Philippines’ pursuit of development. The Department of Education (DepEd) is considered to be one of the most corrupt agencies in the Philippines. However, there are two DepEd programmes with different levels of effectiveness in controlling corruption. The Textbook Delivery Programme has been ineffective while the Programme on Basic Education has been successful. The article explains the different levels of implementing these programmes by using local perspectives via the ‘narratives of implementation actors’. Apart from providing insights on the challenges facing the evolving educational bureaucracy in the Philippines, this article also demonstrates the utility of network actor perspectives in appreciating the many concerns that determine and impede implementation performance and discusses the causes and impact of corruption and policy implementation on two public educational programmes.     

Families in need of supervision

Abstract

Even judiciaries that do not have histories of serious or pervasive corruption need to be watchful lest what I refer to as judicial corrosion occurs. Drawing on studies of institutional entropy, I identify some of the external and internal sources of such corrosion and comment briefly on challenges that face its prevention or repair within the judicial realm.     

Age structure and crime rates: The conflicting evidence

Because arrest rates are especially high for teenagers and young adults, criminologists have long contended that age structure changes affect crime trends. In recent years, however, this belief has been drawn into question because crime has not declined even though high-crime age groups have shrunk. We argue that the age/crime relationship is probably exaggerated because the high arrest rates for younger persons are due partly to their lesser ability to escape arrest, younger persons commit more group crime, and the age structure of victims should be taken into account. We then review 90 studies that regress crime rates on age structure; only a small minority consistently finds significant relationships. Because of methodological problems in this research, one cannot conclude that the age/crime relationship does not exist, but the weight of evidence shows that forecasts based on demographic trends are not likely to be helpful.