Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liability for Punitive Damages

An experiment was conducted to investigate whether hindsight bias influences an important class of legal decisions—civil jurors' judgments of liability for punitive damages. Jury-eligible citizens were shown a videotaped summary of the circumstances surrounding an environmental damage lawsuit. Some subjects were presented a foresight perspective and asked to judge whether or not a railroad should comply with an order to stop operations on a section of track that had been declared hazardous. Other subjects were asked to judge whether the railroad was liable for punitive damages after an accident occurred. Three independent variables were manipulated: temporal perspective with one third of the subjects assessing risks in foresight and two thirds assessing risks in hindsight; subject role with one half of the subjects asked to assume the role of a juror rendering a verdict and one half the role of a citizen whose personal opinion was solicited; and, in the hindsight conditions only, the amount of damage ($240,000 vs. $24,000,000) caused by the accident. Almost all measures of participants' judgments and thoughts about the case showed dramatic foresight–hindsight differences. The participants' role had an effect on some measures; for example, participants in the juror role exhibited slightly smaller hindsight effects when judging liability than did those in the citizen role. The magnitude of the damage caused by the accident had no effects on any measures.     

Validation of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory for Axis II Disorders: Does It Meet the Daubert Standard?

Law and Human Behavior - Relevant to forensic practice, the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) established the boundaries for the admissibility of scientific...     

Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiff's Requests and Plaintiff's Identity on Punitive Damage Awards

Two experiments were conducted to study the manner in which civil jurors assess punitive damage awards. Jury-eligible citizens were shown a videotaped summary of an environmental damage lawsuit and told that the defendant had already paid compensatory damages. They were asked to judge liability for punitive damages and, if damages were to be assessed, to assign a dollar award. Three independent variables were manipulated in the case materials: the dollar amounts that were explicitly requested by the plaintiffs in their closing arguments to the jury, the geographical location of the defendant corporation, and the location of the lead plaintiff. Consistent with prior findings of anchor effects on judgments, we found that the plaintiffs requested award values had a dramatic effect on awards: the higher the request, the higher the awards. We also found that local plaintiffs were awarded more than were geographically remote plaintiffs, while the location of the defendant company did not have reliable effects on the awards. The implications of these results for procedures in civil trials and for theories of juror decision making are discussed.     

Public Opinion and Collective Obligations

This article attempts to identify the general principles that underlie public reasoning about collective obligations and that help explain when political parties can create new obligations or defend existing ones. I use these principles to President Clinton’s unsuccessful attempt to create government health-care plan and attempts by President Bush to privatize Social Security. The success of a party in selling – or defeating – an obligation depends upon what people believe about the competence and capacity of government and the value of autonomy – choices made by each citizen; whether people perceive the obligation as providing floors or establishing ceilings by limiting choice or otherwise restricting opportunities for the better-off; and whether the program is more like insurance or more like welfare. A party’s ability to maintain credibility with voters also depends upon whether party leaders can suppress issues that threaten intra-party elite pacts. When attempts to suppress “taboo” issues like “stem cells” or “black crime” fail, the party loses credibility with its voters and attempts to defend or sell obligations fail.

Implementing Change in an Urban School District: A Case Study of the Reorganization of the Little Rock School District

In July 2005, the Little Rock, Arkansas, school district implemented a new policy to reorganize its management structure in order to create a more efficient bureaucracy. Using Richard Matland’s ambiguity‐conflict model of policy implementation, the authors examine the implementation of this school reorganization policy. Interviews and surveys were conducted with the superintendent and his executive assistants, school principals, teachers, and staff. In line with Matland’s model, the findings suggest that successful implementation is directly related to the policy characteristics of ambiguity and conflict. However, the authors point to the importance of recognizing particular characteristics for different groups of stakeholders within the policy implementation process. Discrepancies among groups of policy actors in the degree of policy ambiguity and policy conflict lead to strikingly different implementation strategies.     

人体组织ABO血型检测方法的研究

探讨人体组织ABO血型检测方法。对已知ABO血型尸体的不同组织,用红细胞粘连试验、吸收—抑制试验和吸收－解离试验进行ABO血型测定。12例尸体的16种组织中均检出与尸体血痕相同的ABH物质。对不同温度保存的组织块进行ABH物质检测的结果显示,4℃保存的组织ABH物质的检出时间长于室温,空腔脏器的检出时间短于实质脏器。三种方法中,红细胞粘连试验简单易行,适用于基层单位,吸收－抑制试验用于组织块的测定时优于吸收－解高试验。