The Market for Financial Report Audits: Regulation of and Competition for Auditor Independence

The independence of auditors and the quality of financial report audits generally are rarely tested except in circumstances of corporate failure when alleged sub-optimality is present. Often auditors have good defences as to their expertise or competency, but rarely do they have equally convincing defences for the independence of their audit. A major issue for the regulation of auditor independence is that the threats to independence are often subtle and difficult to measure. This paper argues that firms undertaking financial report audits need to be transparent and competitive in respect of auditor independence. Two models that adopt this premise are proposed.     

THE DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO CONSUMER PROTECTION REGULATION

Using a legal system of strict liability allowing contributory negligence as a valid defense provides an alternative to consumer protection regulation. In addition, the strict liability system allows rapid and responsive compensation to injured individuals. Corporate uncertainty as to future costs and business environment are substantially reduced, thus allowing firms to make accurate and rational long-term, strategic plans. This paper presents the basic functional constructs required for developing a viable regulatory framework using strict liability and then looks at an example where it could be employed. The scenario deals with an environmental pollution and protection problem. In the example, a strict liability system allowing for a defense of contributory negligence is shown to be conceptually more efficient and desirable than the existing regulatory system and negligence liability procedures.