Thomas Hobbes and the philosophy of punishment

In this article I argue for a full appraisal of Hobbes's theory of punishment which takes account of its divergent and contradictory aspects. Examining his theory within the general context of his position in Leviathan, it is possible to see its centrality for the subsequent development of the modern philosophy of punishment. From this point of view, it is also possible to pinpoint the source of a central weakness in the retributive theory of punishment.     

Methodological issues in marital violence research

Recent interest in all aspects of domestic violence has stimulated rapid proliferation of research and literature. Although the knowledge base has grown, what we don't know still far exceeds what we do know. Starting from nothing, initial research tended to “sweep with a wide broom” in an effort to develop direction. The absence of an accepted methodology produced wide sample and design variations and inconsistent findings. The urgent press for information promoted a desire to disseminate “facts” that may have been less than factually derived from research that may have originally been seen as pilot in nature. This paper discusses the methodological issues that may have contributed to some of the inconsistencies in the marital violence literature and makes suggestions for the design and interpretation of research.     

Scientific and legal standards of statistical evidence in toxic tort and discrimination suits

Many legal disputes turn on scientific, especially statistical, evidence. Traditionally scientists have accepted only that statistical evidence which satisfies a 95 percent (or 99 percent) rule — that is, only evidence which has less than five percent (or one percent) probability of resulting from chance.The rationale for this rule is the reluctance of scientists to accept anything less than the best-supported new knowledge. The rule reflects the internal needs of scientific practice. However, when uncritically adopted as a rule for admitting legal evidence, the seemingly innocuous 95 percent rule distorts the balance of interests historically protected by the legal system. In particular, plaintiffs in toxic tort and employment discrimination suits are effectively held to a heavier burden of proof in showing that their injuries were more probably than not caused by the defendant's actions. The result is that too many victims of toxic torts or employment discrimination cannot win legal redress for their injuries.Proposals to adopt stringent scientific rules of evidence thus implicate significant philosophical issues about the relation of evidence to belief and to practical action. The underlying objectives of the tort law system are not those of scientific practice, and each set of objectives has standards of evidence specific to it.Previous versions of this paper were read at the UCLA Law and Philosophy Discussion Group and at the Orange County Moral and Political Philosophy Discussion Group. We have benefitted from comments by Steve Munzer, Peter Aranella, Craig Ihara, Gary Watson, David Estlund, and Alex Rosenberg. A longer version of this paper is in preparation. In that paper we hope to develop some of the items merely sketched in this paper.