The Young Turk Historical Imagination in the Pursuit of Mythical Turkishness and its Lost Grandeur (1911–1914)

Based on a comprehensive reading of the 1912–1914 issues of the journal Turkish Homeland, the highbrow intellectualist periodical of the Turkist intellectuals and the ruling Committee of Union and Progress, this article argues that sublime Turkishness envisaged by the Young Turks can be construed as a character build-up. The article also examines how history was utilized as an arsenal from where the sublime ‘Turkish character’ was extracted in a decade in which interest towards Turkic history burgeoned, arguing that valiant Turkic heroes from the glorious Turkic past were discovered or rediscovered to stand out as exemplary men and epitomes of incorruptibleness inspiring the new youth.     

Sport,Space and National Identity in Ireland: The GAA,Croke Park and Rule 42

In April 2005, the Gaelic Athletic Association, the largest sporting organisation in Ireland, amended Rule 42, which hitherto banned rugby and soccer matches from being played at Croke Park, the association's headquarters and national stadium. This paper traces the genealogy of the debate that preceded the announcement and examines how and why a decision of seemingly little socio-cultural and political significance became an important issue within broader discourses concerned with national identity in Ireland. Drawing, in particular, on the writing of Henri Lefebvre, and situating the discussion within an interdisciplinary body of literature concerned with sport, space and national identity in Ireland, the authors argue that Croke Park has emerged in recent years as a space of conflicting Irish nationalisms.     

Models of liberty: Berlins's ‘Two Concepts’

According To Sir Isaiah Berlin; (a) freedom is an essentially ‘negative’ concept; (b) one's freedom can only be limited deliberately, by another person or persons; (c) the impersonal operation of a natural force, such as gravity, cannot be said to limit freedom; (d) the impersonal operation of a market force cannot be said to limit freedom. I argue that all four claims are false and that (b), (c), and (d) are logically incornsistent with (a). There would be less point to inevitably somewhat ‘picky’ exercise were it not for the fact that Berlin's account of freedom exemplifies a well-entrenched and influential orthodoxy. The fact is made particularly apparent by the prominent role played by assumption (d) in defences of the ‘free market’. I go on to discus this.