The Privatization of Security: Lessons from Iraq

Images of private forces in Iraq—killed and mutilated in Fallujah, implicated in prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, and shooting up civilian vehicles—have provided a dramatic illustration of the role private security companies (pscs) now play in U.S. military operations. Though the United States’ use of contractors on the battlefield is not entirely new, the increased number of contractors deployed and the use of private security forces to perform an escalating number of tasks has created a new environment that poses important trade-offs for U.S. policy and military effectiveness and for U.S. relations with other states. This article outlines the history of U.S. contractors on the battlefield, compares that with the use of private security in Iraq, discusses the benefits and risks associated with their use, and proposes some trade-offs that decision-makers in the United States should consider while contemplating their use in the future.     

Basic education clusters in Cambodia: looking at the future while learning from the past

School clusters have been adopted as an education policy by most Asian countries since the 1960s. In Cambodia, primary schools have been organised in clusters since 1993. Clusters were considered a mechanism for quality improvements of education and a way to facilitate sharing and interaction between schools. Primary school clusters have been partially successful. Today there is a growing interest among Cambodian policymakers for integrating primary schools (Grades 1–6) and lower secondary schools (Grades 7–9). This article provides a policy suggestion by arguing for extending the cluster mechanism to these integrated basic education schools with all grades from 1 to 9.     

COIN flips: American international relations and counter-insurgency

The essay examines the recent rehabilitation of counter-insurgency doctrine, especially as conducted by third party interveners. The advent of the refurbished US (United States) Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency field manual, a volume with scholarly self-presentation, is the focal point. This essay is concerned with the dubious bases of the doctrinal justifications driving recent US interventions. The Vietnam War turns out to be the crucial case for American scholars and policy-makers who have construed the history of counter-insurgency there as an unacknowledged success, which today has become the standard account in American International relations scholarship. The essay is a critical examination of this development and of its implications.