Vietnam's Better War

When General Creighton Abrams took command of U.S. forces in Vietnam a better war resulted from his superior understanding of the war and more effective conduct of it, including improvement of South Vietnam's armed forces and emphasis on pacification. As American forces were progressively withdrawn, the South Vietnamese took on more and more of the load, winning the counterinsurgency war and fighting valiantly and effectively against the enemy's conventional invasion until the United States Congress drastically reduced materiel and financial assistance at the same time communist forces received massively increased support from their patrons. Thus, inevitably, South Vietnam succumbed.     

Learning from Contemporary Conflicts to Prepare for Future War

Recent and ongoing wartime experience has discredited much of the thinking that underpinned the “Defense Transformation” effort in the 1990s. If we are to be prepared for future conflict, it is vital that we learn from experience and adjust our thinking about war. It is time to develop idealized visions of future war that are consistent with what post-9/11 conflicts have revealed as the enduring uncertainty and complexity of war. These concepts should be “fighting-centric” rather than “knowledge-centric.” They should also be based on real and emerging threats, informed by recent combat experience, and connected to scenarios that direct military force toward the achievement of policy goals and objectives. We must then design and build balanced forces that are capable of conducting operations consistent with the concepts we develop.     

Defense Management Challenges for the Next American President

The next American president will face a daunting list of national security problems, including a serious defense budget crunch. The budget crisis will be deepened by the global financial crisis, a tapering of supplemental funding associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the steady growth of military healthcare and other personnel costs. After six years of rapid defense budget increases, the Pentagon has lost the practice of matching strategy and resources. The next president will need to manage risk among investments in irregular warfare, counterterrorism, balancing new super powers, countering weapons of mass destruction, and traditional warfare. He will also need to begin to build non-military “soft power” capabilities outside of the Pentagon.     

COIN Machine: The British Military in Afghanistan

This article assesses the British military effort in Afghanistan looking at three key elements in the campaign: strategy, military operations, and the inter-agency “Comprehensive Approach.” We start by recognising the scale of the challenge that has faced the British: of all the provinces in Afghanistan, Helmand is the toughest to stabilize and secure. We then examine the evolution of all three elements above and find significant improvements in each: a flawed strategy has been corrected; the military have received more resources and become significantly better at COIN; and there is significant progress in the development of the inter-agency approach. In short, what the Americans will find in Helmand is a British COIN machine; a little creaky perhaps, but one that is fit for purpose and getting the job done. We briefly conclude on the prospects and the key to success: namely the development of a more coherent international strategy that accommodates the challenges posed by both Afghanistan and Pakistan.     

The Political Situation in Pakistan and China-Pakistan Relations

For the year past, Pakistan was intertwined with domestic and external conflicts which continued to upgrade, giving rise to political turmoil. However, in face of such mishaps, the people of Pakistan and politicians of various factions put their national interests first and held successful general elections and organized a new government for a fresh start of the development of the country.     

Effective Advice in Decisions for War: Beyond Objective Control

For half a century the study of civil-military relations has focused on the problem of civilian control, with Huntington's objective control concept supported as the optimal solution not only for civilian control in peacetime but also for military success in war. The challenges of modern warfare suggest the need for a new problématique founded upon the essential need for accuracy in pre-war net assessments. Inaccurate pre-war assessments, rather than a purported dearth of objective control or ‘derelictions of duty,’ explain many problems with recent war efforts. Furthermore, accurate pre-war assessments are hindered by objective control arrangements. An alternative approach of Open Debate among civilian and military leaders, would, in the pre-war period, acknowledge the need for high-level discussion of non-politicized expertise from multiple institutions. Open Debate would require altering institutional arrangements as well as the education of public servants.