Visualization of biological traces on evidence by ninhydrin

Because of possible contamination of samples with PCR inhibitors and to avoid the typing of mixed profiles the source material for forensic DNA investigations should be collected as directly and securely as possible from the evidence. This approach requires a detectability of the source material which is often not given. The procedure introduced here using selected cases enables visualization of DNA-containing materials on evidence and hence controlled analysis. For this purpose the specimen is treated with ninhydrin. A following dye reaction verifies the presence of biological material, which possibly contains DNA. An impact on subsequent STR-analysis was not observed.     

Regulating balance sheet audit: A game theoretical analysis

Summary  The decision situation implicit to balance sheet audit is modelled as a game theoretical model and examined for its behavioural implications. Possible types of decisions are identified as Nash equilibria. The basic game model is characterized by an equilibrium in mixed strategies. Its properties are discussed in detail with respect to alternative scenarios of statutory audit. The regulatory propositions of separation between audit and consulting, on the one hand, and the rotation of auditors, on the other, are analyzed in the context of the game. It turns out that these measures may have contradictory effects on the quality of the balance sheet audit and it depends on the specification of regulatory details and the reaction of the agents whether the one or the other effect dominates in the end. Another proposition to enhance the audit performance is the extension of the liability of statutory auditors. Prerequisites for the success of this measure are that either no professional liability insurance exists or that, if otherwise, deductibles are calculated as a fixed percentage of the loss. The examples refer to German legal rules, however, similar legal rules are valid for most of the developed market economies.     

Versuch/Vollendung im Strafprozess

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

The Policy of Strategic Demobilisation: The Social Policy of the Christian Democratic–Liberal Coalition, 2009–13

This article addresses two research questions: which course did the CDU, CSU–FDP coalition government choose to follow in social policy from 2009 to 2013? And what relationships exist between social policy in this period and the Bundestag election in 2013? The analysis of primary and secondary data reveals both continuity and discontinuity in social policy in the 17th legislative period of the Bundestag. The decisions and non-decisions on social protection and labour market regulation in this period mirror a wide variety of determinants. These include partisan effects, electoral cycles, co-governing judges and anonymous social policy of market forces. The data also suggest that the CDU/CSU has been relatively successful in its strategy of ‘asymmetric demobilisation’, the strategy of changing its social policy profile to one more similar to that of its social democratic opponent, in order to demobilise the SPD's voters rather than mobilising them. More ambivalent has been the electoral outcome of the FDP's role in social policy. The FDP's first foray into leading a large welfare state ministry, the Federal Ministry of Health, in 2009 to 2013 did not prove to be a winning proposition for the Liberals electorally. Social policy in general and welfare state recalibration in particular thus seem to be an electorally especially risky project for a liberal party such as the FDP.     

Laudatio: Verleihung des Theodor Eschenburg-Preises an Prof. Dr. Gerhard Lehmbruch am 25. September 2003 auf dem Kongress der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft in Mainz

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Rolf G. Heinze: Die Berliner Räterepublik. Viel Rat — Wenig Tat?

Politische Vierteljahresschrift -     

Time-consistent monetary policy under output persistence

This note merges the fact that real activity is persistent with a Barro-Gordon type model of endogenous monetary policy. It shows that persistence crucially affects policy choices. This applies in non-cooperative games with a finite horizon, and in games with an infinite horizon. Always, enforceable inflation announcements move higher when output persistence increases. Policymakers who discount future utility by 10% annually produce about ten times as much inflation under near-hysteresis as in a natural-rate scenario. A change in the policymaker's time preference may affect inflation both ways, depending on present time preference and persistence.     

Literatur

Ohne Zusammenfassung