Electoral Institutions and Distributive Policies in Parliamentary Systems: An Application to State Aid Measures in EU Countries

Electoral institutions should systematically affect the propensity of a country to rely and spend on distributive measures. Supporting evidence is however still rare because of the difficulty in finding comparable cross-national data, the employment of dummy variables to account for the electoral systems, and the failure to recognise the interacting effects of different electoral rules on policy outcomes. Employing national data on state aid expenditure and a number of measures across European Union countries, the article provides evidence that legislators elected in higher magnitude districts spend less. More interestingly, it shows the interlocking policy effects of electoral institutions. Where high district magnitude is combined with ballot control, party-based voting and pooling, these rules conjunctly dampen politicians’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote and lead to lower spending on, and use of, distributive measures. Where high district magnitude is not combined with these rules, results are inconclusive. With one exception though, if leaders do not have control over the ballot rank, higher magnitude increases reliance on distributive measures. Results are robust to several alternative political-economy explanations of fiscal policy outcomes.     

District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences—a reply and new perspectives

We reply to the comment of John Carey and Simon Hix on our original contribution entitled “District Magnitude and Representation of the Majority’s Preferences: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Popular and Parliamentary Votes” in Public Choice 151:585–610 (2012). District magnitude does not necessarily affect deviations between political representatives and their district voters in a strictly monotonic way but monotonicity is upheld for deviations between representatives and the national majority. We provide new perspectives and caution against evaluating electoral systems by focusing on individual politicians’ behavior but neglecting aggregation effects.     

Long swings in the growth of government expenditure: an international historical perspective

Public Choice - Adopting an international historical perspective, this study aims to identify the main empirical regularities in the long-run growth pattern of government expenditure. The...     

Information-based trade in Russia and the effects of listing abroad

This paper offers empirical evidence about transaction cost in Russia. After relating empirical measures of information and liquidity to corporate characteristics, competitive theories about cross-listings are tested. Since cross-listings generate competitive effects on transaction costs, potential to affect price discovery exists. The results reveal a lower share of private information for cross-listed firms since more transparent accounting standards reduce the incentives to collect superior information. Robustness for the evidence presented in favor of the legal bonding hypothesis is provided by those firms which list with the highest Russian standards. Measures of information-based trade are lower and the likelihood of listing abroad is significantly higher.     

Electoral Competition through Issue Selection

Politics must address multiple problems simultaneously. In an ideal world, political competition would force parties to adopt priorities that reflect the voters' true concerns. In reality, parties can run their campaigns in such a way as to manipulate voters' priorities. This phenomenon, known as priming, may allow parties to underinvest in solving the issues that they intend to mute. We develop a model of endogenous issue ownership in which two vote‐seeking parties (a) invest in policy quality to increase the value of their platform and (b) choose a communication strategy to prime voters. We identify novel feedback between communication and investment. In particular, we find that stronger priming effects can constrain parties to invest more resources in all issues. We also identify the conditions under which parties prefer to focus on their “historical issues” or to engage in “issue stealing.”     

欧洲专利申请程序及途径介析

在欧洲申请专利有四种途径:直接适用国内程序;直接适用欧洲专利局程序;国内程序和专利合作条约程序相结合;欧洲专利局程序和专利合作条约程序相结合。不同申请途径的主要程序各不相同、各有不足。对这些程序进行介绍和分析,有助于专利代理人了解欧洲专利申请,以更好地为客户服务。     

Investigating the determinants of pretrial settlement rates: contingent versus non-contingent lawyers’ fees

In this article, we explore the possibility that the percentage of litigations settled outside of court is affected by the degree of contingency of lawyers’ fees. In our view, a litigation is a game where not only the plaintiff and the defendant, but also their lawyers are independent players. The main consequence of this assumption is that the authority to settle is allocated endogenously to either the clients or their lawyers, depending on the value of the relevant parameters. In this game theoretical setup, (1) we compare the incentives to settle provided by contingent and non-contingent lawyers’ fees, and (2) we state the conditions under which settlement is more likely to happen.