Property Rights and Game-Theory Implications of Satellite Communications: The Bilateral Case of Greece and Russia

In this paper we examine the actual legal situation concerning the attribution of geostatic positions and frequencies and the problems of frequency interference by other satellites due to not fully clear property rights. We analyze the property rights setting governing satellite communications and review the implications of the Coase theorem of these rules through a game theoretical approach between two players: Russia and Greece (Hellasat commercial communication attempt). The basic finding, in accordance with the theorem's prediction under non-zero and possibly high transaction costs, is that the end result may be sub-optimal due to the inappropriate present specification of property rights, leading either to non-use of scarce resources, or to total over-investment.     

Drifting towards convergence? Motivation and performance management in state and private companies in the provision of telecom services in Ghana

The concept of expectancy on which many of the theories of workplace incentive programmes are based, claims that when employees are given a particular level of motivation, it will result in some level of performance. The general perception in Ghana is that public sector employees do not perform as efficiently as private sector workers because they lack incentives to do so. However, few studies have compared the incentive structures of the two sectors. Using empirical evidence from four telecom companies in Ghana, this article shows that the gaps between ‘state’ and ‘private’ have narrowed. Also, while incentive structures such as salary, fringe benefits and job (in)security are converging, critical performance management processes like employees' participation in decision‐making, performance appraisal, monitoring and credibility of sanctions are drifting apart. This article concludes that differences in performance between state and private companies may be explained by performance management processes and not incentive structures. It cautions that improved salaries and other office perquisites may not by themselves achieve organisational performance. Rather, incentives should be embedded in a broader approach through effective performance management processes. The information in the article is relevant to the ‘borderline’ part of the public sector under a deregulated environment. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Politically valued resources and preferred outcomes: Does the political context matter?

Previous research has concluded that ownership of economic resources that are politically valued leads to preferential outcomes during interactions with government officials. However, how the political context, and specifically the roles of the government actors involved, influences the relationship between political valued resources (PVRs) and desired outcomes has to date been relatively unexplored. In our paper, we argue that in interactions with elected legislators, PVRs are much more likely to lead to preferential outcomes. Conversely, due to the lack of power these resources have with bureaucrats in charge of regulatory enforcement, PVRs are less likely to lead to preferential outcomes. We provide some support for our arguments by looking for shifting patterns of effects in outcome variables that typically fall under the jurisdiction of each political role type. We find that large firms, export firms, and technology firms largely report having favorable influence over laws and regulations due to lobbying and increased foreign ownership, while also spending more days in inspections and more managerial time dealing with regulations.     

The Politics of Obstruction: Republican Holds in the U.S. Senate

A defining feature of the modern US Senate is obstruction. Almost all pieces of legislation considered in the Senate are affected either directly or indirectly by obstruction. Obstruction takes many forms in the modern Senate, but one of the most prevalent, yet least studied, is the hold. Using a newly created dataset on Republican Senate holds, we cast light on this important practice. Our results suggest that a variety of factors including timing, party status, and a senator's voting record are related to both the prevalence of holds and the success of legislation subject to holds in the Senate.